United Nations S/2015/746

Security Council

Distr.: General
30 September 2015

Original: English

Letter dated 28 September 2015 from the Secretary-General addressed to the President of the Security Council

I have the honour to refer to the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH), established by Security Council resolution 1542 (2004) of 30 April 2004 and most recently extended by resolution 2180 (2014) of 14 October 2014.

Following the usual consultations, I would like to inform you of my intention to appoint Lieutenant-General Ajax Porto Pinheiro (Brazil) as Force Commander of MINUSTAH. He succeeds Lieutenant-General José Luiz Jaborandy Junior (Brazil), who passed away on 30 August 2015. I would like to take this opportunity to express my appreciation for the contribution made by Lieutenant-General Jaborandy Junior to the work of the United Nations for peace, including in Haiti.

I should be grateful if you would bring this matter to the attention of the members of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) **BAN** Ki-moon

15-16585 (E) 011015

Please recycle

United Nations S/2015/747

Security Council

Distr.: General
30 September 2015

Original: English

Letter dated 30 September 2015 from the President of the Security Council addressed to the Secretary-General

I have the honour to inform you that your letter dated 28 September 2015 (S/2015/746) concerning your intention to appoint Lieutenant-General Ajax Porto Pinheiro (Brazil) as Force Commander of the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH) has been brought to the attention of the members of the Security Council. They take note of the intention expressed in your letter.

(*Signed*) Vitaly **Churkin**
President of the Security Council

15-16586 (E) 011015

Please recycle

United Nations S/2015/748

Security Council

Distr.: General
8 October 2015

Original: English

Letter dated 30 September 2015 from the Permanent Representative of Burundi to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council

I have the honour to submit evidence of the aggressive behaviour made by Rwanda to Burundi.*

I kindly request that you share the present letter with other Security Council members as a working document.

(*Signed*) Albert **Shingiro**
Ambassador
Permanent Representative of Burundi

* The documents are on file with the Secretariat and are available for consultation.

15-17441 (E) 151015

Please recycle

United Nations S/2015/749

Security Council

Distr.: General
1 October 2015

Original: English

Letter dated 1 October 2015 from the Permanent Representative of Spain to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

I have the honour to forward to you a concept note for the Security Council open debate on women and peace and security, which will be held on 13 October 2015 (see annex).

I should be grateful if the present letter and its annex could be circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Román **Oyarzun**

15-16679 (E) 051015

Please recycle

Annex to the letter dated 1 October 2015 from the Permanent Representative of Spain to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

High-level review of Security Council resolution 1325 (2000): from rhetoric to effective results

Open debate of the Security Council

13 October 2015

The open debate will be chaired by the Prime Minister of Spain, Mariano Rajoy.

The Secretary-General will deliver a statement at the beginning of the open debate.

Briefers:

- Under-Secretary-General/Executive Director of the United Nations Entity for Gender Equality and the Empowerment of Women, Phumzile Mlambo-Ngcuka
- Director of Fonds pour les femmes congolaises and President of the Administration Board of Solidarité féminine pour la paix et le développement intégral, Julienne Lusenge
- President of the Organization of Women's Freedom in Iraq, Yanar Mohammed

Some 15 years ago, the Security Council adopted resolution 1325 (2000), drawing attention to the differing impact of armed conflict on women and girls, their exclusion from conflict prevention, peacekeeping, conflict resolution and peacebuilding, and the inextricable links between gender equality and international peace and security. The thematic resolution was adopted following a decade of peacekeeping failures in Rwanda, Somalia and the former Yugoslavia. It was the result of the active mobilization of women's groups globally after the Fourth World Conference on Women, held in Beijing in 1995, and the strong determination of some of the then members of the Council.

The world has seen significant changes since 2000. In less than a decade, the number of major violent conflicts has almost tripled (see A/70/357-S/2015/682, para. 2). The nature of conflict has also changed:[1] cycles of fragility and insecurity have become entrenched in many regions; the interconnections between natural disasters, humanitarian crises and conflicts are more visible; and the number of refugees and internally displaced persons is higher than ever before in the Organization's history, with many of them expected to remain displaced for almost

[1] Both the High-level Independent Panel on Peace Operations and the Advisory Group of Experts on the Review of the Peacebuilding Architecture have referred to the changing face of global conflict. The growing threat posed by violent extremism and terrorism adds another layer to the already-complex global and regional conflict scenario (see A/70/95-S/2015/446, paras. 8, 12 and 80, and A/69/968-S/2015/490, annex, paras. 10, 11, 14, 19 and 53).

two decades, the current average length of displacement. All of this is also affected by new and emerging threats, the most prominent of which is the rise of violent extremism and terrorism, perhaps the greatest threat to global peace and security at present.

Since 2000, we have also witnessed various positive developments, such as the creation of the United Nations Entity for Gender Equality and the Empowerment of Women (UN-Women) and the appointment of special representatives of the Secretary-General on sexual violence in conflict and for children and armed conflict. The responses of the Security Council and the Organization have also shifted over the period. Perhaps most significantly, the gradual consideration of violations of human rights and humanitarian law as being threats to international peace and security has created new spaces for the Council to engage across the main pillars of United Nations activity.

With regard to women and peace and security specifically, six resolutions have followed resolution 1325 (2000). Together, the seven resolutions elevate the importance of women's participation and leadership in all aspects of peace and security, recognize sexual violence in conflict as a threat to international security and an impediment to peacebuilding and create obligations for United Nations actors and Member States to both empower and protect women and girls in conflict-affected contexts.

The year 2015 is a decisive year for United Nations efforts with regard to both gender equality and peace and security. We have just celebrated the twentieth anniversary of the Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action and recently launched a new development agenda for the coming 15 years. In addition to the current review of resolution 1325 (2000), an emblematic resolution, through this open debate and a global study on its implementation, we have reviewed the Organization's peace operations and peacebuilding architecture. The convergence of the three processes provides an invaluable opportunity to develop a holistic approach to conflict prevention, peacemaking and peacebuilding by, among other things, ensuring the participation and leadership of women across all areas and stages of response.[2] The reviews will also be complemented by the outcome of the upcoming World Humanitarian Summit and by the plan of action that the Secretary-General will announce in the next weeks, containing practical measures to prevent violent extremism. The high-level review of the implementation of resolution 1325 (2000) and the global study that will inform it provide an invaluable opportunity to reflect on the current status of the implementation of the women and peace and security agenda and to make specific and ambitious commitments to its full realization.

Diagnosis

In conducting a brief overview of the women and peace and security agenda since it was taken up by the Security Council as a separate thematic issue in 2000, we have come to the general conclusions set out below.

[2] As the Secretary-General stated in October 2010, "advancing the cause of women, peace and security must be integral to our peacemaking, peacekeeping and peacebuilding efforts, not an afterthought".

The Security Council has established a relatively robust normative framework on women and peace and security.[3] There remains, however, an implementation gap at Headquarters[4] and, above all, on the ground. In practice, priority is not accorded to the protection and participation of women. Instead, this is often seen as an add-on and non-political component, rather than as a critical aspect of the peace and security equation for both women and men, as well as for society as a whole.

The most challenging gap that remains concerns the participation of women in peace processes and post-conflict political transitions, even as empirical evidence reveals a strong connection between the inclusion of women in peace processes and more durable and stable peace. Participation issues should be systematically tackled together with the protection issues and recognized as mutually reinforcing. We can affirm that the Security Council has rarely acted to proactively prevent conflict.[5] Investing in participation has a strong impact on prevention.

Even if the normative framework created by the Security Council since 2000 is broad, there are areas that have not been addressed directly in resolution 1325 (2000) and subsequent resolutions on women and peace and security, including emerging threats such as the role of women in countering violent extremism and terrorism.[6] While the use of rape, sexual slavery and forced marriage and other forms of sexual violence has been identified as part of the strategic objectives, ideology and funding of extremist groups such as ISIS in parts of the Syrian Arab Republic and Iraq and Boko Haram in Nigeria (see S/2015/203, para. 83), analysis of the role of women as victims of a broad range of rights violations at the hands of extremists, and equally their role as perpetrators, agents of prevention and response, as well as of populations affected by both terrorism and counter-terrorism strategies, remains inadequately addressed. As such, the women and peace and security agenda has not been adequately integrated into the response of the international community to this threat.

The failure to allocate sufficient resources, the lack of political will, accountability and available expertise and persistent attitudes of resistance by

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[3] Following the adoption of resolution 1325 (2000), the Security Council adopted no resolutions on women and peace and security until 2008. Between 2008 and 2010, the Council had an extraordinary level of normative activity in that field, adopting resolutions 1820 (2008), 1888 (2009), 1889 (2009) and 1960 (2010). It later adopted two other resolutions: 2106 (2013) and 2122 (2013).

[4] In this regard, the gains made with regard to the conflict-related sexual violence agenda since the creation of the Office of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General on Sexual Violence in Conflict, and the strengthened implementation architecture both in the field and with the advent of the Team of Experts on the Rule of Law and Sexual Violence in Conflict, represent a critical advance.

[5] The importance of prevention in general terms is also underlined in the 2015 report of the Secretary-General on women and peace and security (S/2015/716, paras. 66 ff). In addition, the Secretary-General notes that, at the rhetorical level, there is strong support for early warning and conflict prevention, but this is not always translated into early action (see A/70/357-S/2015/682, para. 34).

[6] There are few references to the integration of a gender perspective into countering violent extremism and terrorism. The Security Council made a commitment to integrating women and peace and security into other thematic issues, such as counter-terrorism, in resolution 2122 (2013). There are also some vague references in resolution 2129 (2013), in resolution 2178 (2014) (with the rise of groups such as ISIS and Boko Haram), resolution 2195 (2014) (on the role of transnational organized crime in supporting terrorism) and 2199 (2015) (on illicit funding sources for ISIS and the Nusrah Front).

gatekeepers and decision makers are among the main reasons why this agenda has not been effectively implemented since the adoption of resolution 1325 (2000).

Main actors

Although the women and peace and security agenda stems from the Security Council, it projects its impact towards the entire membership of the United Nations, the United Nations system and civil society. The Council should strengthen its role in being accountable for its own decisions on women and peace and security, but regional organizations, the entire United Nations system and, above all, Member States also have their own responsibility to address the challenges faced by this agenda. Addressing the challenges is the main goal of the open debate.

While the Security Council established the normative foundations for the agenda, it is not an implementing arm of the United Nations system and cannot be expected to achieve the required outcomes in isolation or without high-quality information and analysis. Implementation also requires significant commitment and action by the broader United Nations system, Member States and civil society.

The United Nations system as a whole, and in particular the Department of Political Affairs and the Department of Peacekeeping Operations, the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs and UN-Women as the lead on women and peace and security matters, should improve its general performance with regard to the agenda by, among other measures, providing analytical and strategic information to the Council on the situation on the ground and by further engaging with civil society, including women's organizations, at the local level. Strengthened collaboration and synergies between peace operations and United Nations country teams are needed, so as to maximize the comparative advantages of each. Stronger determination on the part of the senior leadership of the United Nations, both at Headquarters and on the ground, is required to effectively deliver on women and peace and security responsibilities.

The Security Council must also strengthen its own commitment to the effective implementation of the women and peace and security agenda. The Council should review its working methods in this regard in order to enhance its performance.

Member States bear the primary responsibility for ensuring that global commitments and obligations in relation to women and peace and security are integrated into national policies and laws. They remain the most influential actors in the implementation of resolution 1325 (2000) as States Members of the United Nations and members of regional organizations, but also in their role as parties to conflict, as donors, as troop and police contributors to peacekeeping operations or as political players in a specific conflict or region. In that regard, it should be underlined that cases of sexual exploitation and abuse endanger the image, legitimacy and effectiveness of the United Nations presence in the field. The Secretary-General has outlined some specific and strong measures to further implement the Organization's zero-tolerance policy,[7] but better follow-up and investigation also require cooperation on the part of Member States, in particular troop-contributing countries.

[7] See A/69/779, A/70/95-S/2015/446, paras. 257-262, and A/70/357-S/2015-682, paras. 119-125.

Regional organizations also have a crucial role to play in the implementation of the women and peace and security agenda. Since the tenth anniversary of the adoption of resolution 1325 (2000), there have been important efforts by regional and subregional organizations to monitor progress, evaluate results and share good practices in the implementation of the agenda.

Last, but not least, members of civil society have been key actors from the outset of the agenda. They are partners and beneficiaries, and more effective ways to systematically engage with civil society organizations at the local level and to empower women's organizations must be found to bridge the gap between international policies and local realities.

Challenges and goals of the high-level review

Among the key challenges facing the women and peace and security agenda are the lack of consistent implementation (see A/70/95-S/2015/446, para. 257), the lack of accountability and the lack of adequate gender-related resources and financing. The open debate and the high-level review afford us an extraordinary opportunity to show that the United Nations and its Member States can promote the cultural shift that the agenda is demanding on the occasion of its fifteenth anniversary. Implementation requires genuine commitment by national leaders,[8] but also by the leadership of the United Nations and regional organizations. It also demands strong determination and support from the financial perspective at the international, national and local levels.

In the light of the foregoing, we encourage:

(a) Member States to go beyond rhetoric by announcing, on the occasion of the high-level review, precise, ambitious and time-bound national commitments in such areas as women's leadership and participation in decision-making, the development and implementation of national action plans, funding allocations, the security and rule of law sectors, countering violent extremism and terrorism, and post-conflict recovery and reconstruction;

(b) Member States that have gone or are going through peace processes to share their good practices and achievements relating to the implementation of the women and peace and security agenda, given that their case studies would be useful for other countries;

(c) The United Nations system to announce specific, ambitious and time-bound commitments in areas such as accountability and reporting; gender architecture, expertise and resourcing; women's participation; and protection, conflict-related sexual violence and sexual exploitation and abuse, so as to demonstrate that the Secretariat and the entire United Nations system effectively prioritize the agenda;

(d) Regional organizations to share information on their own women and peace and security architecture, the communication channels established with civil society, their ways to monitor and report on the progress in the implementation of

[8] The High-level Independent Panel on Peace Operations underlines that the lack of national leadership in making the women and peace and security agenda a national political and governance priority is the main impediment to the implementation of the agenda (see A/70/95-S/2015/446, para. 257).

the agenda and how they envisage closer cooperation between regional organizations and the United Nations;

(e) The Security Council to consider how it can improve its performance on a daily basis, not only through a more coherent and systematic approach to its thematic agenda items (women and peace and security, protection of civilians, sexual violence in conflict, children and armed conflict or countering terrorism), but also through its country-specific items, given that solutions should be tailored to the specific context.

Participation, briefers and outcome

The open debate will be chaired by the Prime Minister of Spain, Mariano Rajoy. The Secretary-General is expected to attend and make a statement at the beginning of the debate. The Under-Secretary-General/Executive Director of UN-Women, Phumzile Mlambo-Ngcuka, will present the conclusions of the Secretary-General in his 2015 report on women and peace and security (S/2015/716). Yanar Mohammed (Iraq) and Julienne Lusenge (Democratic Republic of the Congo) will provide a briefing on behalf of civil society.

We encourage all participants to deliver concise but strong and focused statements, lasting no longer than three minutes, so that everyone can contribute to and interact in the review of resolution 1325 (2000). Longer statements can be sent in advance to highlevelreviewwps@unwomen.org and will be published on the UN-Women web page, together with the present concept note.

An outcome document of this high-level review is expected.

United Nations S/2015/750

Security Council

Distr.: General
1 October 2015

Original: English

Letter dated 1 October 2015 from the Permanent Representative of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council

I have the honour to transmit to you a letter from the National Coalition of Syrian Revolution and Opposition Forces (see annex).

I should be most grateful if you would have the present letter and its annex circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Matthew **Rycroft**

15-16678 (E) 021015

Please recycle

Annex to the letter dated 1 October 2015 from the Permanent Representative of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council

On behalf of the National Coalition of Syrian Revolution and Opposition Forces, it is with great alarm that I draw your attention to escalating Russian military aggression in Syria and its lethal impact on civilians.

On Wednesday, Russian air forces indiscriminately attacked opposition-held areas in Homs Province, leaving behind a path of destruction and death in their wake. Under the false pretence of engaging in counter-terrorism operations, Russian forces indiscriminately bombed civilian areas, killing innocent men, women and children. Rescue workers from the Syrian civil defence teams on the ground reported that Russian warplanes had indiscriminately bombed civilians, resulting in 34 civilian deaths, 10 of which were children and 7 of which were women, as well as injuries to 146 civilians, including 45 children.

These indiscriminate aerial attacks are part of an overt and calculated attempt by Russian forces to aid and abet the Syrian regime's war on civilians. They are designed not to counter terrorist extremist groups like ISIS, but to support the Assad regime's indiscriminate slaughter of civilians. By involving itself so directly in the killing of innocent Syrians, Russia makes itself a direct party to the Syrian conflict and risks implicating itself in war crimes. Russia's actions violate not only the Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, of 12 August 1949, but also Security Council resolution 2139 (2014), which demands that all parties to the conflict distinguish between civilian populations and combatants and refrain from indiscriminate attacks and attacks on civilians.

Russia's actions will have consequences — not merely for Russians inside Syria, but for the fight against ISIS. The Russian forces' indiscriminate slaughter of civilians will fuel extremism and exacerbate the refugee crisis. Like Assad's barrel bombs, Russia's unwanted invasion will serve as a recruiting tool for ISIS and will make Syria — and the world — less safe.

On behalf of the people of Syria, I appeal to the States members of the Security Council to work with urgency to condemn in the strongest terms Russia's illegal military aggression in Syria and pursue all means necessary to stop the indiscriminate aerial bombardment in Syria, including through the enforcement of a ban on aerial bombardment: a no-bombing zone. If Russia — as party to the conflict — will not allow the Council to act, Member States must themselves ensure the protection of civilians.

(*Signed*) Khaled **Khoja**
President
National Coalition of Syrian Revolution and Opposition Forces

United Nations S/2015/751

Security Council

Distr.: General
5 October 2015

Original: English

Letter dated 24 September 2015 from the Permanent Representative of the Islamic Republic of Iran to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

Upon instructions from my Government, and with reference to the letter dated 27 July 2015 from the Permanent Representative of France to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/2015/568), requesting to circulate an annexed letter of an entity engaged in crimes and violence in Syria, while I strongly reject all the allegations against my country contained in that letter, I wish to bring the following to your attention:

1. The very act of submitting such baseless propaganda against a Member State by another Member State to be circulated as a document of the United Nations runs counter to the very purposes and principles of the United Nations, which consist, inter alia, of developing friendly relations among nations and peacefully resolving international disputes.

2. This act also amounts to misusing an established practice at the United Nations and employing it in the service of spreading lies and distorting facts, which can only serve short-sighted political interests and narrow agendas. This certainly aggravates rather than eases tensions and is contrary to the purposes and principles enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations.

3. The Islamic Republic of Iran has always warned against terrorism and violent extremism and the provision of support to extremists in the region. It is imperative for all Member States to adopt a responsible and serious approach in order to focus on real challenges that jeopardize peace and security in our region.

I would be grateful if you could have the present letter circulated as a document of the Security Council

(*Signed*) Gholamali **Khoshroo**
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

15-17157 (E) 061015

Please recycle

United Nations S/2015/752

Security Council

Distr.: General
28 August 2015

Original: English

Report of the Secretary-General concerning the credentials of the alternate representative of Angola on the Security Council

Pursuant to rule 15 of the provisional rules of procedure of the Security Council, the Secretary-General wishes to report that he has received a letter dated 28 August 2015 from the Permanent Representative of Angola to the United Nations stating that Xavier Santa Rosa has been appointed alternate representative of Angola on the Security Council.

In the opinion of the Secretary-General, this letter constitutes adequate provisional credentials.

15-16691 (E) 021015

Please recycle

United Nations S/2015/753

Security Council

Distr.: General
21 August 2015

Original: English

Report of the Secretary-General concerning the credentials of the alternate representative of New Zealand on the Security Council

Pursuant to rule 15 of the provisional rules of procedure of the Security Council, the Secretary-General wishes to report that he has received a letter dated 21 August 2015 from the Permanent Representative of New Zealand to the United Nations stating that Charlotte Darlow has been appointed alternate representative of New Zealand on the Security Council.

In the opinion of the Secretary-General, this letter constitutes adequate provisional credentials.

15-16730 (E) 021015

Please recycle

United Nations S/2015/754

Security Council

Distr.: General
2 October 2015

Original: English

Letter dated 2 October 2015 from the Permanent Representative of New Zealand to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council

During our presidency of the Security Council, in July 2015, New Zealand hosted an open debate on the peace and security challenges facing small island developing States. We are grateful to everyone who participated, with more than 70 speakers, representing the three regions of small island developing States and the broader membership of the United Nations, delivering statements on this important issue.

New Zealand, in its national capacity, has produced a non-paper providing a summary of some of the key themes and proposals raised by participants during the open debate (see annex). We hope that this is a useful contribution to ongoing discussions in the Council and other forums.

I would be grateful if you could circulate the present letter and its annex as a document of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Gerard **van Bohemen**

15-16742 (E) 071015

Please recycle

Annex to the letter dated 2 October 2015 from the Permanent Representative of New Zealand to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council

Maintenance of international peace and security: peace and security challenges facing small island developing States

Security Council open debate

30 July 2015

Non-paper

Introduction

New Zealand, as President of the Security Council, convened an open debate on the peace and security challenges facing small island developing States on 30 July 2015.

The debate was an opportunity for small island developing States to highlight their specific challenges and vulnerabilities in the context of international peace and security and to exchange views with Security Council members and other Member States on how to effectively respond to them.

The open debate was chaired by the Minister for Foreign Affairs of New Zealand, Murray McCully. The following briefers addressed the Security Council:

(a) Secretary-General of the United Nations;

(b) Prime Minister of Samoa, Tuilaepa Sailele Malielegaoi;

(c) Prime Minister of Jamaica, Portia Simpson Miller;

(d) Minister of Finance of Seychelles, Jean-Paul Adam.

In total, 72 speakers, representing the three regions of small island developing States (Pacific, Caribbean and Atlantic, Indian Ocean and South China Sea) and the broader membership of the United Nations, delivered statements. Nineteen countries were represented at the level of Head of Government or the ministerial level.

The present non-paper, compiled by New Zealand in its national capacity, provides a summary of the key themes and proposals raised by participants during the open debate. It is not a complete or official record of the debate. It does not represent an endorsement of the themes and proposals identified by participants. A full record of the open debate is available on the website of the Security Council (see S/PV.7499).

Background

The United Nations classifies 52 countries and territories as small island developing States, with a combined population of more than 50 million people. This includes 37 Member States, one fifth of the total membership. Of these, only six have served on the Security Council in the past 25 years.[1] While the Council has

[1] Mauritius (1977/78 and 2001/02), Jamaica (1979/80 and 2000/01), Trinidad and Tobago (1985/86), Cabo Verde (1992/93), Guinea-Bissau (1996/97) and Singapore (2001/02).

occasionally pronounced on matters affecting small island developing States, it has not given serious, comprehensive and sustained consideration to the perspectives of those States.

Pursuant to the SIDS Accelerated Modalities of Action (SAMOA) Pathway (Samoa Pathway), the outcome document adopted at the third International Conference on Small Island Developing States, in 2014 (see resolution 69/15) States:

(a) Reaffirmed the importance of peace and security issues for small island developing States;

(b) Recognized the centrality of rising sea levels and other adverse impacts of climate change, which, for many small island developing States, represent the gravest of threats to their survival and viability;

(c) Recognized the negative effects that conflict, violence, trafficking in persons, drug trafficking, cybercrime and transnational organized crime can have on small island developing States and supported the efforts of those States to combat these phenomena;

(d) Noted the challenges facing small island developing States, in terms of limited resources and capacity, in responding effectively to multiple crises;

(e) Recognized the urgent need to enhance international cooperation and action to address the unique and particular vulnerabilities of small island developing States.

During the open debate, speakers commented that the timing, following closely after the commitments made by the international community in the Samoa Pathway, provided an opportunity for the Security Council to consider the unique peace and security challenges faced by small island developing States. This included re-examining traditional notions of peace and security in the context of a world faced with interconnected, complex and varied challenges and considering the role of the United Nations in effectively tackling these twenty-first century security challenges.

Peace and security challenges faced by small island developing States

During the open debate, speakers focused on the impact of the following challenges on the peace and security of small island developing States:

(a) Climate change and natural disasters;

(b) Transnational organized crime and piracy;

(c) Governance and exploitation of natural resources;

(d) Sustainable development and peace and security;

(e) United Nations peace and security initiatives.

Climate change and natural disasters

Speakers observed that the unique geographies and environments of small island developing States meant that they were at the front lines of the effects of climate change and weather-related disasters, which were projected to increase in

frequency and severity. Many such States were faced with rising sea levels and coastal erosion, which threatened their territorial integrity and, in some cases, their very existence. A single natural disaster could, owing to its disproportionate impact relative to the national capacities of those States, destroy vital infrastructure, displace a significant portion of their populations or have an impact on their sustainable economic growth trajectories. Climate change was also identified as a risk multiplier, exacerbating existing security and development challenges. Small island developing States were recognized for their leadership in the transition to renewable energy, in particular for proactively addressing the challenge of energy insecurity caused by dependence on expensive fossil fuels and for building resilience to energy insecurity.

Many speakers called for an ambitious and legally binding outcome from the twenty-first session of the Conference of the Parties to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, to be held in December 2015. While small island developing States were particularly vulnerable to its impacts, climate change was recognized by many speakers as a global concern and a global responsibility. The importance of making resources available, including through the Green Climate Fund, to address and mitigate the impacts of climate change was emphasized, as was the need for capacity-building to enable small island developing States to gain access to climate financing.

Some speakers requested the Secretary-General to update his 2009 report to the General Assembly on climate change and possible security implications (A/64/350) and called for the threats posed by climate change to international peace and security to be included on the agenda of the Security Council. The 12 small island developing States in the Pacific region also called for the appointment of a special representative on climate and security with responsibility for analysing the projected security impacts of climate change. They also called for an assessment of the capacity of the United Nations system to respond to the impact of climate change.

Transnational organized crime and piracy

A key theme of the open debate was transnational organized crime and piracy, including the illicit trafficking of small arms and light weapons, people, drugs and wildlife, as well as money laundering and cybercrime. Speakers stated that transnational criminal networks were increasingly targeting small island developing States because of their location on important trade routes, slow rates of economic growth and high rates of unemployment. Many such States had difficulties protecting their extensive exclusive economic zones and the integrity of their borders. Speakers emphasized that small island developing States were committed to combating illicit trade, including by scaling up efforts in border management, developing regional crime and security strategies and adhering to the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea. Many small island developing States had joined multilateral counter-terrorism efforts and opposed the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. There was a call to strengthen the legal basis for international cooperation to counter transnational organized crime and piracy, and for increased technical assistance and capacity-building in this area.

Governance and exploitation of natural resources

A key theme was the challenge that the illicit exploitation of natural resources posed to small island developing States in obtaining a greater share of the income generated from their natural resources. This, in turn, undermined prospects for sustainable economic development and contributed to insecurity and instability. Small island developing States highlighted the value of oceans and fishery resources, with weak governance of the oceans being recognized as both a threat to territorial integrity and global security.

Speakers noted that illegal, unreported and unregulated fishing was a major threat, given the significance of fisheries for small island developing States, the economies of those States and the livelihoods of their people. Small island developing States often represented attractive targets for such fishing, given the policing challenges associated with large exclusive economic zones, relative isolation and high-value fishery resources. Illegal, unreported and unregulated fishing undermined the sustainability of valuable fishery resources, endangered food security and caused significant economic losses. In response, some small island developing States had adopted a regional approach to combat such fishing to facilitate information-sharing and avoid duplication of effort. To address the challenges posed by such fishing, small island developing States called for a greater and more equitable share of the sustainable development of natural resources (for example, a greater allocation of revenue from fishery catches), recognition of marine protected areas and the provision of technical support, including support to strengthen monitoring, control and surveillance systems.

Small island developing States sought greater cooperation at both the regional and international levels to address threats such as ocean acidification and marine debris. The second "Our Ocean" conference, to be held in Chile in October 2015, was identified as a forum to address the issues, including by reaching agreement on voluntary commitments on ocean acidification and marine pollution. Calls were made to enhance the awareness of small island developing States of, and capacity to benefit from, the legal regimes relevant to their vast maritime domains.

Sustainable development and peace and security

The link between sustainable development and peace and security was highlighted, with many speakers emphasizing that there could be no development without security or security without development. Speakers noted that small island developing States faced specific developmental challenges as a result of their small economies, narrow resource and economic bases and often high international debt levels. The lack of economic diversity made such States particularly vulnerable to global and external financial shocks and the potentially adverse impact of single investors on financial stability. It was noted that high levels of indebtedness could limit a country's fiscal capacity to finance development and respond to peace and security challenges.

Small island developing States emphasized that they were committed to the sustainable development of their islands and people. They had worked to ensure that their challenges were considered in negotiations on the post-2015 development agenda and in the supporting financing mechanism, the Addis Ababa Action Agenda of the Third International Conference on Financing for Development. In support of their efforts, small island developing States called on the international community to

take a holistic view of peace and security and development and, in particular, to reinforce their national development efforts through capacity-building, technology transfer and innovation, improved access to markets and strategies to reduce debt levels.

United Nations peace and security initiatives

Small island developing States reaffirmed their role as active multilateral actors, committed to playing their part in global peace and security issues in a manner consistent with their national capacities. This included providing personnel to United Nations-mandated peace operations (both policing and military), participating in global frameworks and conventions and implementing Security Council resolutions. There were calls for the Council to prioritize engagement in preventative diplomacy to mitigate the risk of conflict or further escalation and to consider an ongoing focus on the peace and security challenges faced by small island developing States by devoting one day annually to their discussion. Options for optimizing the representation of small island developing States on the Council were also requested. The Council was called upon to play a greater role in ensuring multilateral system coherence to deliver as one, including on peace and security issues.

Genuine and durable partnerships

Building on the Samoa Pathway, there was strong and consistent emphasis throughout the open debate, by speakers from small island developing States and non-small island developing States alike, on the importance of genuine and durable partnerships to support small island developing States in addressing their peace and security challenges. For example, some speakers identified the need for new international partnerships between small island developing States and international donors in areas such as hydro, geothermal and wind power generation. Partnerships to supplement resources, fill gaps, enable innovative solutions and build the capacity of small island developing States at the national and regional levels could assist those States in delivering sustainable development and peace and security for their people.

United Nations S/2015/755

Security Council

Distr.: General
5 October 2015

Original: English

Letter dated 2 October 2015 from the Secretary-General addressed to the President of the Security Council

Pursuant to Security Council resolution 2227 (2015), I have the honour to transmit a note verbale dated 22 September 2015 from the Permanent Mission of France to the United Nations, conveying the report to the Council on the implementation of the mandate of French troops in Mali (see annex).

I should be grateful if you would bring the present letter and its annex to the attention of the members of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) **BAN** Ki-moon

15-17158 (E) 071015 071015

Please recycle

Annex

[Original: French]

The Permanent Mission of France to the United Nations presents its compliments to the Secretary-General of the United Nations and has the honour to inform him of the following:

Pursuant to Security Council resolution 2164 (2014), paragraph 26, and resolution 2227 (2015), paragraph 27, France wishes to transmit herewith the report on activities conducted between 20 May and 31 August 2015 by France in support of the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali.

The Permanent Mission of France to the United Nations would be grateful if the Secretary-General would bring this report to the attention of the members of the Security Council.

The Permanent Mission of France to the United Nations takes this opportunity to convey to the Secretary-General the renewed assurances of its highest consideration.

Enclosure

[Original: French]

Report on the operational support provided by French forces to the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali between 20 May and 31 August 2015

References: Security Council resolution 2164 (2014), paragraph 26, and resolution 2227 (2015), paragraph 27.

This ninth report since the establishment of the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) summarizes the activities conducted between 20 May and 31 August 2015 by French forces in support of MINUSMA, pursuant to Council resolution 2164 (2014), paragraph 26, and resolution 2227 (2015), paragraph 27.

Since 20 May 2015, no combat action has been conducted in response to an "imminent and serious threat" to MINUSMA. It should be noted, however, that French forces have intensified their support for the Mission, as follows:

1. Logistical support

(a) Transport and related activities

On 7 June 2015, the Barkhane force sent a convoy of materiel to the Dutch contingent in Kidal, and on 19 June 2015 it transported MINUSMA civilian personnel by helicopter from Kidal to Gao.

(b) Health

The Barkhane force regularly provides medical assistance in the areas under its control (Ansongo, Gao and Tessalit) to some MINUSMA personnel in the vicinity.

2. Operational military support

In terms of instruction, the French liaison and operational support detachments have expanded the kind of across-the board training they provide to MINUSMA units, by setting up programmes of instruction devised in conjunction with the sectoral or unit command posts. The instruction covers a variety of areas: firing skills, tactical preparation for patrols, response to ambushes, use of artillery, helicopter guidance, protection against improvised explosive devices, and combat rescue operations.

United Nations S/2015/756

Security Council

Distr.: General
5 October 2015

Original: English

Letter dated 2 October 2015 from the Permanent Representative of the Sudan to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council

I have the honour to convey to your attention, and through you to the attention of the esteemed members of the Security Council, the two decrees* issued by President Omer Hassan Ahmed Al-Bashir on the declaration of ceasefire for two months and the amnesty granted to the armed-group leaders who will participate in the National Dialogue Conference.

I should be grateful if the present letter were circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Omer Dahab Fadl **Mohamed**
Permanent Representative

* The decrees are on file with the Secretariat and are available for consultation.

15-17169 (E) 091015

Please recycle

United Nations S/2015/757

Security Council

Distr.: General
5 October 2015

Original: English

Identical letters dated 4 October 2015 from the Permanent Representative of Israel to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council

I am writing to you in regard to the string of heinous terror attacks on Israeli citizens that took place this past week, during the Jewish holiday of Sukkot. On Saturday night, a Palestinian terrorist attacked an Israeli family on the streets of the Old City of Jerusalem, stabbing and killing Nehemia Lavi, father of seven, and Aharon Bennett, whose wife and 2-year-old son were also attacked and injured. Just hours later, a 15-year-old Israeli teenager was stabbed and critically injured just outside the Old City.

Two days earlier, an Israeli mother and father, Eitam and Na'ama Henkin, were killed by Palestinian terrorists in a shooting attack on their vehicle. Eitam and Na'ama's four children, aged 9, 7 and 4 years old, and a 4-month-old baby, were in the vehicle at the time of the attack and watched their parents die in front of their eyes.

Eitam and Na'ama Henkin were killed while driving back from a reunion with friends during holiday celebrations. Aharon Bennett was murdered as he took his family to celebrate holiday prayers at the Western Wall, and Nehemia Lavi was murdered for coming to the aid of the Bennett family. Just two weeks ago, on Rosh Hashana, Alexander Lebelovitch was killed while returning home from a holiday dinner when Palestinians attacked his car with a barrage of stones, causing him to crash. Sadly, Palestinian terrorists are trying to turn the holiday season into a season of grief.

Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas has refused to condemn these attacks. Instead of calming tensions, Abbas has used this holiday season to increase his inflammatory rhetoric and his dangerous incitement. Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has repeatedly made it clear, most recently at his address last week to the General Assembly, that "Israel is fully committed to maintaining the status quo" at the Temple Mount. Despite these clear and unequivocal statements, Abbas continues to deliberately spread false allegations about Israel's intentions on the Temple Mount with the sole purpose of sparking violence among the Palestinian people. In this he joins in league with extremists groups such as Hamas and Islamic Jihad.

Last week, Abbas stood at the podium of the United Nations General Assembly and declared that the Palestinian Authority is working to spread the culture of peace and coexistence. Families are under fire as they return from holiday celebrations: is this a culture of peace and coexistence?

Please recycle

These horrific killings and the recent escalation of attacks against Israelis are a result of the ongoing instigation to violence by the Palestinian leadership. The Secretary-General of the United Nations has condemned these attacks, yet the Security Council remains silent, as always.

I should be grateful if you would have the present letter distributed as a document of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Ron **Prosor**
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

United Nations A/70/413–S/2015/758

General Assembly
Security Council

Distr.: General
7 October 2015
English
Original: Arabic

General Assembly
Seventieth session
Agenda item 37
The situation in the Middle East

Security Council
Seventieth year

Identical letters dated 18 September 2015 from the Permanent Representative of Lebanon to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council

On instructions from my Government, I transmit to you herewith a statistical summary of Israeli violations of Security Council resolution 1701 (2006) committed during the month of August 2015 (see annex).

I should be grateful if you would have the present letter and its annex circulated as a document of the General Assembly, under agenda item 37, and of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Nawaf **Salam**
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

15-17315 (E) 191015 201015

Please recycle

Annex to the identical letters dated 18 September 2015 from the Permanent Representative of Lebanon to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council

Land violations

Date	*Time*	*Nature of violation*
1 August 2015	0905	On the outskirts of the town of Shab'a at the Jabal al-Shahl locality, near observation point OP2 of the Indian contingent of the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL), an Israeli enemy patrol comprising 15 soldiers violated the line of withdrawal, entering some 50 metres into Lebanese territory, and tried to abduct the shepherd As'ad Hamdan, who fled with his flock in the direction of the town. The enemy patrol withdrew into occupied territory at 0930 hours.
2 August 2015	1350	From inside Palestinian territory at the Manarah North 1 position, an enemy Israeli bulldozer arrived at the Shaykh Abbad position and performed maintenance work on the dirt road along the technical fence. The bulldozer's arm crossed the technical fence without violating the Blue Line. It returned to the Manarah North 1 position at 1410 hours.
4 August 2015	1300	Inside the occupied Shab'a Farms at the Saddanah locality, near observation point OP3 of the UNIFIL Indian contingent, while an Israeli enemy tank and engineering vehicle were driving from the Jabal al-Rus position to the Birkat al-Naqqar position, the tank personnel pointed the cannon at personnel at the Lebanese Army observation point for three minutes. They then left in the direction of the Jabal al-Rus position.
5 August 2015	1227 1233	From inside occupied territory opposite the Israeli enemy Hula East position, an Israeli enemy patrol comprising three personnel and a Hummer vehicle approached. One of the personnel trained the Hummer vehicle's mounted weapon at two civilians on the Lebanese side.
8 August 2015	1640	Opposite the town of Kafr Killa near crossing B82, an Israeli enemy patrol comprising two Hummer vehicles and a Jeep approached. Some 12 personnel stepped out and conducted a foot patrol near the technical fence, where they photographed passers-by and trained their personal weapons on Lebanese territory. The patrol left in the direction of occupied territory at 1715 hours.
14 August 2015	2130 2215	The Israeli enemy fired 11 flares over the Summaqah and Ruwaysat al-'Alam positions inside the occupied Shab'a Farms.
16 August 2015	1200	Inside occupied Palestinian territory, opposite the Lebanese Army Duhayrah position, a number of Israeli enemy soldiers carried out clearing and maintenance work near their position, using a Poclain excavator and a white pick-up truck. Three hostile soldiers loaded their personal machine guns and pointed them at Lebanese Army personnel. The Israeli enemy finished work and the soldiers and pick-up returned in the direction of occupied territory at 1800 hours.
18 August 2015	1945 2015	Several explosions were heard from inside the occupied Shab'a Farms.

Date	*Time*	*Nature of violation*
19 August 2015	0830	Inside occupied Palestinian territory opposite Lebanese Army Maysat observation point, an Israeli enemy patrol comprising a Poclain excavator, a wheeled bulldozer and two steamrollers arrived and repaired and cleared the road along the technical fence. The Poclain excavator extended its boom above and across the technical fence by approximately two metres for clearing. The Israeli enemy finished work at 1730 hours.
20 August 2015	0800	Inside occupied Palestinian territory opposite the Lebanese Army Wazzani observation point OP8, between the Nakhilah and Maysat East positions, an Israeli enemy patrol comprising a wheeled bulldozer, a Poclain excavator, a steamroller, a civilian pick-up truck and a personnel carrier with the flag of the Nahal Brigade of the Israeli enemy army arrived and carried out clearing and maintenance work on the road along the technical fence. Its arm crossed the technical fence into Lebanese territory. The Israeli enemy army finished work and the vehicles withdrew in the direction of occupied territory at 1730 hours.
21 August 2015	0930	Opposite the town of Blida, near observation point BP28, an Israeli enemy patrol comprising four vehicles and approximately 15 soldiers was observed. The soldiers stepped out and conducted a deployment drill, taking up combat positions facing Lebanese territory. They withdrew at 1030 hours.
23 August 2015	1315	Inside occupied Palestinian territory, opposite Bi'r Shu'ayb – Blida, personnel from an Israeli enemy patrol comprising 12 soldiers, a Hummer vehicle and a Land Rover vehicle stopped opposite the Lebanese Army observation point and directed curses in Arabic at soldiers at the observation point.
	1340	From inside occupied territory opposite the Kafr Killa crossing, an Israeli enemy foot patrol comprising seven personnel arrived and directed foul language at passers-by. They withdrew into occupied territory at 1415 hours.
25 August 2015	1300	From inside occupied Palestinian territory opposite Duhayrah, in the area surrounding the Israeli enemy position, three engineering vehicles arrived and carried out excavation and clearing work, accompanied by a number of soldiers who deployed at the location. Two of them trained their personal weapons on Lebanese Army personnel stationed at their position in Duhayrah. The Israeli enemy finished work at 1420 hours.
26 August 2015	0700	Inside occupied Palestinian territory, opposite the Lebanese Army Udaysah checkpoint, an Israeli enemy patrol comprising two Poclain excavators, a Defender vehicle, a Hummer vehicle and a Merkava tank arrived. The tank pointed its cannon at Lebanese territory while the Poclain excavator extended its arm over the technical fence and uprooted trees located near the fence. It also did some digging outside the technical fence and deposited dirt on the road along the fence. The Israeli enemy finished work at 0845 hours.
27 August 2015	1050	Inside occupied Palestinian territory, opposite the Amrah area between the Metullah position and the Amrah South 2 position, an Israeli enemy patrol comprising two wheeled bulldozers, a steamroller, two Hummer vehicles and two white Rapid vehicles arrived. One of the soldiers carried out clearing and maintenance work on the road along the technical fence. Another pointed his 12.7 mm machine gun, which was mounted on the Hummer vehicle, in the direction of Lebanese territory. The work ended at 1320 hours, and the patrol withdrew into occupied territory.

Date	*Time*	*Nature of violation*
28 August 2015	1225	Inside occupied territory, opposite the Labbunah locality at the Israeli enemy position of Jall al-'Alam, a number of Israeli enemy soldiers trained their personal weapons on a Lebanese Army patrol.
29 August 2015	0935	On the outskirts of the town of Shab'a at the Jabal al-Shahl locality near observation point OP2 of the UNIFIL Indian contingent, while the civilians Isma'il Zahra and Mahir Hamdan were herding livestock, an Israeli enemy patrol shot at them from inside occupied territory without injuring anyone. They returned to the town of Shab'a with their livestock.
	1530	On the outskirts of the town of Shab'a at the Saddanah locality, near observation point OP3 of the UNIFIL Indian contingent, the Israeli enemy fired into the air from inside occupied territory over a livestock herder on Lebanese territory.
	1530 1600	From the area around the Birkat al-Naqqar position, soldiers from an Israeli enemy patrol in a Merkava tank directed medium weapon fire at the Ruwaysat al-'Alam position inside the occupied Shab'a Farms.

Sea violations

Date	*Time*	*Nature of violation*
3 August 2015	1913	Opposite Ra's al-Naqurah, an Israeli enemy military launch violated the southern maritime boundary established by Decree 6433 (2011) of 1 October 2011, proceeding some 225 metres into Lebanese territorial waters over a three-minute period before leaving in the direction of occupied Palestinian territorial waters.
4 August 2015	1841	Opposite Ra's al-Naqurah, an Israeli enemy military launch violated the southern maritime boundary established by Decree 6433 (2011), proceeding some 165 metres into Lebanese territorial waters over a two-minute period before leaving in the direction of occupied Palestinian territorial waters.
	2140 2235	From inside occupied Palestinian territory at its position opposite Ra's al-Naqurah, the Israeli enemy directed a searchlight towards Lebanese territorial waters three times: the first time for 15 seconds, and the second and third times for 20 seconds.
6 August 2015	2150 2330	From inside occupied Palestinian territory at its position opposite Ra's al-Naqurah, the Israeli enemy directed a searchlight towards Lebanese territorial waters for seven periods of 20 seconds each.
9 August 2015	2045 2300	From inside occupied Palestinian territory at its position opposite Ra's al-Naqurah, the Israeli enemy directed a searchlight towards Lebanese territorial waters five times: the first and second times for 15 seconds, the third time for 20 seconds, and the fourth and fifth times for 15 seconds.
10 August 2015	2019 2100	From inside occupied Palestinian territory, the Israeli enemy directed a laser towards personnel of the UNIFIL Indonesian contingent, and four times in the direction of Lebanese territory.

Date	*Time*	*Nature of violation*
16 August 2015	0936	Opposite Ra's al-Naqurah, an Israeli enemy military launch violated the southern maritime boundary established by Decree 6433 (2011), proceeding some 280 metres into Lebanese territorial waters over a 64-minute period before leaving in the direction of occupied Palestinian territorial waters.
22 August 2015	2125 2310	From inside occupied Palestinian territory, opposite Ra's al-Naqurah, the Israeli enemy directed a searchlight towards Lebanese territorial waters six times: the first and second times for 10 seconds, the third time for five seconds, the fourth time for 10 seconds, and the fifth and sixth times for five seconds.`

Air violations

Date	*Time*	*Nature of violation*
1 August 2015	0650	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Kafr Killa. It circled over the South, Riyaq, Baalbek, Hirmil and Beirut and its suburbs before leaving at 1555 hours over Naqurah.
	1030	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Kafr Killa. It circled over the South before leaving at 1430 hours over Alma al-Sha'b.
2 August 2015	0950	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Naqurah. It circled over Beirut and its suburbs before leaving at 1700 hours over Alma al-Sha'b.
	1000	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Aytarun. It circled over the South before leaving at 1445 hours over the sea off Naqurah.
	1040	Two Israeli enemy warplanes violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Kafr Killa. They circled over the sea between Juniyah and Tripoli before leaving at 1205 hours over Alma al-Sha'b.
	1355	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Rumaysh. It circled over the South before leaving at 1915 hours over Alma al-Sha'b.
3 August 2015	0745	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Naqurah. It circled over Beirut and its suburbs and Ba'abda before leaving at 2330 hours over Naqurah.
4 August 2015	0700	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Naqurah. It circled over Beirut and its suburbs before leaving at 1800 hours over Alma al-Sha'b.
5 August 2015	0615	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Naqurah. It circled over Beirut and its suburbs before leaving at 2305 hours over Alma al-Sha'b.
	0715	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Kafr Killa. It circled over Riyaq, Baalbek and Hirmil before leaving at 1500 hours over Rumaysh.

Date	*Time*	*Nature of violation*
	1000	Two Israeli enemy warplanes violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Kafr Killa. They circled over all regions of Lebanon before leaving at 1215 hours over Alma al-Sha'b.
6 August 2015	0545	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Naqurah. It circled over Beirut, Matn and Ba'abda before leaving at 1525 hours over Naqurah.
	1415	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Naqurah. It circled over Beirut, Matn and Ba'abda before leaving at 0645 hours on 7 August 2015 over Naqurah.
7 August 2015	0815	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Naqurah. It circled over Beirut, Matn and Ba'abda before leaving at 1325 hours over Kafr Killa.
	1615	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over the sea west of Naqurah. It circled over Beirut, Matn and Ba'abda before leaving at 0200 hours on 8 August 2015 over Naqurah.
8 August 2015	0550	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Naqurah. It circled over Beirut, Matn, Ba'abda, Baalbek and Hirmil before leaving at 2245 hours over Kafr Killa.
	1400	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Kafr Killa. It circled over the South before leaving at 0700 hours on 9 August 2015 over Alma al-Sha'b.
9 August 2015	0630	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Alma al-Sha'b. It circled over Beirut and its suburbs and the South before leaving at 2030 hours over Alma al-Sha'b.
	0945	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Rumaysh. It circled over Riyaq, Baalbek and Hirmil before leaving at 2050 hours over Rumaysh.
	1100	Two Israeli enemy warplanes violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Kafr Killa. They circled over all regions of Lebanon before leaving at 1215 hours over Alma al-Sha'b.
	2045	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Rumaysh. It circled over Riyaq, Baalbek and Hirmil before leaving at 2235 hours over Kafr Killa.
10 August 2015	0700	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Naqurah. It circled over Matn, Ba'abda, Beirut, the South and the Western Bekaa before leaving at 1655 hours over the sea west of Naqurah.
	1010	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Naqurah. It circled over Matn, Ba'abda and Beirut before leaving at 2045 hours over Naqurah.

Date	*Time*	*Nature of violation*
	1720	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Kafr Killa. It circled over the South and the Western Bekaa before leaving at 2240 hours over Aytarun.
11 August 2015	0600	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Rumaysh. It circled over Beirut, Matn, Ba'abda, Riyaq, Baalbek and Hirmil before leaving at 1500 hours over Alma al-Sha'b.
	1520	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Kafr Killa. It circled over the Western Bekaa, Beirut and its suburbs and the South before leaving at 0240 hours on 12 August 2015 over Rumaysh.
	1635	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Rumaysh. It circled over the South before leaving at 1925 hours over Kafr Killa.
	2110	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Rumaysh. It circled over the South before leaving at 2310 hours over Alma al-Sha'b.
12 August 2015	0235	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Rumaysh. It circled over the South before leaving at 1530 hours over Alma al-Sha'b.
	0600	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Alma al-Sha'b. It circled over Riyaq, Baalbek and Hirmil before leaving at 1615 hours over Kafr Killa.
	1205	Two Israeli enemy warplanes violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Kafr Killa. They circled over all regions of Lebanon before leaving at 1340 hours over Alma al-Sha'b.
	1625	Four Israeli enemy warplanes violated Lebanese airspace, entering over the sea west of Jubayl. They circled over all regions of Lebanon before leaving at 1700 hours over Rumaysh.
13 August 2015	0600	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Alma al-Sha'b. It circled over the South before leaving at 1400 hours over Rumaysh.
	0915	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Kafr Killa. It circled over the South, Riyaq, Baalbek and Hirmil before leaving at 2000 hours over Naqurah.
14 August 2015	1355	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Kafr Killa. It circled over the South before leaving at 1725 hours over Alma al-Sha'b.
17 August 2015	0610	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Rumaysh. It circled over the South, Riyaq, Baalbek and Hirmil before leaving at 1810 hours over Naqurah.
18 August 2015	1040	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Kafr Killa. It circled over the South, the Western Bekaa, Riyaq, Baalbek and Hirmil before leaving at 1310 hours over Kafr Killa.

Date	*Time*	*Nature of violation*
	1240	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Naqurah. It circled over the South and the Western Bekaa before leaving at 1700 hours over Naqurah.
	1945 2015	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft circled over the occupied Shab'a Farms.
19 August 2015	0655	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Kafr Killa. It circled over Riyaq, Baalbek and Hirmil before leaving at 1450 hours over Kafr Killa.
20 August 2015	0600	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Rumaysh. It circled over Riyaq, Baalbek and Hirmil before leaving at 1500 hours over Kafr Killa.
	1010	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Kafr Killa. It circled over Riyaq, Baalbek and Hirmil before leaving at 2230 hours over Rumaysh.
	1020	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Kafr Killa. It circled over the South before leaving at 2100 hours over Alma al-Sha'b.
21 August 2015	1010	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Alma al-Sha'b. It circled over Beirut and its suburbs, Jubayl and Tripoli before leaving at 1650 hours over Alma al-Sha'b.
23 August 2015	1035	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Kafr Killa. It circled over Rashayya, Hasbayya, the Western Bekaa and the South before leaving at 1545 hours over Naqurah.
24 August 2015	0605	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Alma al-Sha'b. It circled over Riyaq, Baalbek and Hirmil before leaving at 2350 hours over Kafr Killa.
	1215	Two Israeli enemy warplanes violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Kafr Killa. They circled over all regions of Lebanon before leaving at 1400 hours over Alma al-Sha'b.
25 August 2015	0610	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Naqurah. It circled over Riyaq, Baalbek and Hirmil before leaving at 1830 hours over the occupied Shab'a Farms.
26 August 2015	0635	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Kafr Killa. It circled over Riyaq, Baalbek and Hirmil before leaving at 2105 hours over Alma al-Sha'b.
	1015	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Kafr Killa. It circled over the South and the Western Bekaa before leaving at 1255 hours over Kafr Killa.
	1240	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Naqurah. It circled over the coasts of Jubayl and Juniyah and west over the sea before leaving at 1510 hours over the sea off Jubayl.

Date	*Time*	*Nature of violation*
	1335	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Kafr Killa. It circled over the South, the Western Bekaa, Riyaq and Baalbek before leaving at 1545 hours over Kafr Killa.
27 August 2015	0650	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Naqurah. It circled over Beirut, Matn, Ba'abda and the South before leaving at 1320 hours over Alma al-Sha'b.
	0750	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Kafr Killa. It circled over Riyaq, Baalbek, Hirmil and the South before leaving at 1405 hours over Naqurah.
	1315	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Naqurah. It circled over the South before leaving at 1625 hours over Naqurah.
	1345	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Alma al-Sha'b. It circled over Riyaq, Baalbek and Hirmil before leaving at 2300 hours over Rumaysh.
28 August 2015	0805	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Naqurah. It circled over Riyaq, Baalbek, Hirmil and Beirut and its suburbs before leaving at 1700 hours over Alma al-Sha'b.
	1010	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Kafr Killa. It circled over Riyaq, Baalbek and Hirmil before leaving at 1800 hours over Rumaysh.
	1220	Two Israeli enemy warplanes violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Kafr Killa. They circled over all regions of Lebanon before leaving at 1400 hours over Alma al-Sha'b.
29 August 2015	0610	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese territory, entering over Alma al-Sha'b. It circled over Riyaq, Baalbek, Hirmil and the South before leaving at 2210 hours over Alma al-Sha'b.
30 August 2015	0800	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Alma al-Sha'b. It circled over the South before leaving at 1725 hours over Rumaysh.
	1035	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Alma al-Sha'b. It circled over the South before leaving at 1315 hours over Alma al-Sha'b.
31 August 2015	0745	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Alma al-Sha'b. It circled over the Western Bekaa and the South before leaving at 1600 hours over Naqurah.
	1255	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Kafr Killa. It circled over Riyaq and Baalbek before leaving at 1710 hours over Kafr Killa.

United Nations A/ES-10/692–S/2015/759

General Assembly
Security Council

Distr.: General
7 October 2015

Original: English

General Assembly
Tenth emergency special session
Agenda item 5
Illegal Israeli actions in Occupied East Jerusalem and the rest of the Occupied Palestinian Territory

Security Council
Seventieth year

Identical letters dated 6 October 2015 from the Permanent Observer of the State of Palestine to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General, the President of the General Assembly and the President of the Security Council

I must draw your urgent attention to the alarming situation in Occupied Palestine, particularly in East Jerusalem, where rising tensions are fuelling another cycle of violence, leading to the loss of innocent civilian lives and a steep deterioration of conditions on the ground.

The backdrop to all this is Israel's ongoing foreign occupation of Palestine and its brutal repression, collective punishment and humiliation of the Palestinian civilian population. While the occupying Power persists with its violations and oppressive measures against the Palestinian people, its occupying forces, extremist settlers and religious zealots have unleashed a barrage of violence and terror against the Palestinian people, causing the death of and injury to Palestinian civilians and the destruction of Palestinian homes and property. Moreover, repeated aggression, provocations and incitement, by both Israeli extremists and government officials, against Al-Haram Al-Sharif in Occupied East Jerusalem and the rights of Muslim worshippers therein are exacerbating religious sensitivities and have heightened the risk of an outbreak of religious conflict with extremely dangerous ramifications. Immediate international attention is required to bring a halt to Israel's illegal policies and practices, ensure immediate protection to the defenceless Palestinian civilian population and avert the situation from spiralling out of control.

In this regard, I regret to inform that one Palestinian child and two Palestinian youths were killed this past weekend. On 5 October, Israeli occupying forces that had raided the Aida refugee camp in Bethlehem killed 13-year-old Abed al-Rahman Shadi Obeidallah, shooting him in the heart, and injuring a teenage boy with live fire. On 4 October, Israeli occupying forces shot in the chest and killed 18-year-old Huthayfa Othman Suleiman in the village of Bala, east of Tulkarem. On the same day, 19-year-old Fadi Samir Mustafa Alloun, from the East Jerusalem neighbourhood of Issawiya, was shot dead by Israeli occupying forces as he was

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fleeing from Israeli settlers attempting to attack him and screaming "Death to Arabs", "Kill the Arabs" and other racist and inflammatory comments. While there is video documenting the incident, in which Fadi was shown to have been clearly killed in cold blood by the occupying forces, there is no proof whatsoever of the allegations that he had committed any crime. Furthermore, following his murder, and adding to the grief and suffering of his family, it was reported that occupying forces had stormed the Alloun family home, assaulting women with rods and tasers and damaging furniture.

The occupying Power's lack of respect for Palestinian civilian life has been repeatedly proved in the brutality of its indiscriminate assaults and aggression perpetrated over the past decades against the Palestinian people. Indeed, the Israeli Government has even legislated this lack of respect for human life in new laws relaxing the rules of engagement for the occupying forces in such a manner as to encourage them to shoot to kill Palestinians, including children, with total impunity. Such gruesome violations will only continue if Israel, the occupying Power, continues to be shielded from accountability and absolved of its obligations to comply with international law, including humanitarian and human rights law, as the entire civilized world is obliged to do.

In addition to the deaths caused by the excessive, deliberate force used by the Israeli occupying forces, since 3 October alone, approximately 500 Palestinians, including children, have been injured in attacks against civilians in cities and towns throughout the Occupied Palestinian Territory. At least 184 of the injured were shot with live ammunition and rubber-coated steel bullets by occupying forces or terrorist settlers, who are armed and roaming in gangs and militias, attacking Palestinian civilians, homes, orchards and vehicles, including ambulances, with total impunity.

In Tulkarem, Israel, the occupying Power, deployed snipers on rooftops and fired live ammunition, tear gas and rubber-coated bullets directly at Palestinian civilians. Three young Palestinians were shot with live fire during the clashes, including Omar Jadba, who was seriously wounded, and six more Palestinians were shot by rubber-coated steel bullets. Nineteen-year-old Muhannad Al-Halabi was shot dead by occupying forces in Occupied East Jerusalem following an alleged stabbing attack. At the Qalandiya checkpoint that separates Ramallah from Jerusalem, four civilians were shot with live fire and two others with rubber-coated steel bullets as occupying forces fired directly at protesters. Israeli occupying forces stormed the Arroub refugee camp near Al-Khalil, firing tear gas canisters at Palestinian homes and at protesters, causing many of them to suffer excessive tear gas inhalation. A siege was also imposed on the camp, preventing all Palestinians from entering or leaving. In addition, a Palestinian security officer was assaulted by occupying forces at the Zatara checkpoint, and the Nablus area remained on virtual lockdown overnight, with the Huwwara and Beit Furik checkpoints closed by the Israeli army.

On 1 October, hundreds of Israeli extremist settlers rampaged across Nablus, carrying out multiple violent attacks against Palestinian homes and vehicles and seizing main roads. Over 200 Israeli settlers attempted to raid the town of Huwwara, south of Nablus, under the protection of Israeli occupying forces, while gangs of settlers raided the village of Burin and smashed Palestinian vehicles near the Huwwara checkpoint. In total, more than 15 Palestinian vehicles were damaged by

settlers, including an ambulance en route to aid Palestinians suffering from tear gas inhalation in Burin after occupying forces had fired stun grenades and tear gas canisters into the village. In the village of Beituniya, near Ramallah, Israeli settlers torched a car, and a Palestinian man was injured after they had smashed his vehicle. Israeli settlers from the illegal settlement of "Beit El" attacked Palestinian vehicles near Ramallah as Israeli occupying forces looked on. Settlers also carried out attacks in the village of Sinjil, north of Ramallah, closed a main north-south highway and carried out attacks against Palestinian civilians and property in Al-Khalil and Bethlehem. Settler depravity in Al-Khalil is particularly notorious and continues to be so. On 5 October, settlers violently assaulted two Palestinians, 13-year-old Adham Musallam and 24-year-old Muhammad al-Tarayra.

These are just a few of the incidents that are taking place in an atmosphere of high tension, which is being gravely exacerbated by the occupying Power's deployment of battalions of hundreds of occupying forces throughout cities, towns, villages and refugee camps in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem, and by its imposition of a discriminatory, illegal ban on Palestinians from entering the Old City in Occupied East Jerusalem and worshipping at Christian and Muslim holy sites, including the Al-Aqsa Mosque. Meanwhile, Israelis and tourists continue to be permitted to enter the Old City and holy sites, and more than 100 extremist Israeli settlers have been allowed to enter Al-Aqsa with the protection and backing of the Israeli Government.

We call on the international community to react to this dangerous escalation and act to protect the Palestinian civilian population under the military occupation of Israel. The international community cannot stand idly by while Israel, the occupying Power, and military forces and extremist settler militias continue their crimes, violence and terror against the Palestinian people, endangering lives, especially our youth, whose vulnerability is most high, as they are clearly being targeted by this reckless and barbaric occupation in deliberate acts of provocation and aggression against the Palestinian civilian population.

The international community, in particular the Security Council, must act responsibly and immediately to de-escalate this crisis and to insist on respect for international law without exception. If Israel, the occupying Power, is permitted to persist with such attacks and illegal measures against the Palestinian people, their land and holy sites with impunity, the situation will surely devolve even further with vastly negative consequences. We urge the Security Council, in line with its duty under the Charter of the United Nations for the maintenance of international peace and security, to act now with a view to addressing this explosive situation, which is threatening to further destabilize the region, and to saving innocent lives. In this regard, the State of Palestine has repeatedly appealed for international protection and calls once again for the protection of the defenceless Palestinian people, who are suffering immensely as a result of the occupying Power's violence and volatility against the civilian population.

Furthermore, with regard to the escalations in Occupied East Jerusalem, and especially at Al-Haram Al-Sharif, we reiterate our unequivocal rejection of all illegal Israeli actions and demand an immediate cessation. It is urgent that firm messages be sent by the international community, backed by consistent actions, to compel Israel, the occupying Power, to comply with all relevant Security Council and General Assembly resolutions calling for a cessation of all measures aimed at

illegally and forcibly altering the character, legal status and demography of the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem, and including the holy site of Al-Haram Al-Sharif.

The risks of inaction are dramatically rising with each passing day that Palestinian suffering deepens, and hopes further diminish that this illegitimate, cruel Israeli occupation will ever come to an end and that the legitimate Palestinian aspirations for freedom, rights and peace will ever be realized. Impunity for Israel and its rejection of peace must be seriously confronted before it is too late to salvage whatever small prospects for peace remain. The matter is urgent and cannot withstand delay, and we appeal to the international community, particularly the Security Council, to act forthwith.

The present letter is in follow-up to our 554 previous letters regarding the ongoing crisis in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem, which constitutes the territory of the State of Palestine. Those letters, dated from 29 September 2000 (A/55/432-S/2000/921) to 22 September 2015 (A/ES-10/691-S/2015/736), constitute a basic record of the crimes being committed by Israel, the occupying Power, against the Palestinian people since September 2000. For all of these war crimes, acts of State terrorism and systematic human rights violations being committed against the Palestinian people, Israel, the occupying Power, must be held accountable and the perpetrators brought to justice.

I should be grateful if you would arrange to have the present letter distributed as a document of the tenth emergency special session of the General Assembly, under agenda item 5, and of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Riyad **Mansour**
Ambassador
Permanent Observer of the State of Palestine to the United Nations

United Nations S/2015/760

Security Council

Distr.: General
8 October 2015
English
Original: French

Letter dated 5 October 2015 from the Permanent Representative of the Democratic Republic of the Congo to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council

1. Upon instructions from my Government, I have the honour to transmit to the Security Council the official position of the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo in order to clarify some of the issues for the Council's consideration in the report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (S/2015/741) and in the report of the Secretary-General on the implementation of the Peace, Security and Cooperation Framework for the Democratic Republic of the Congo and the Region (S/2015/735). These reports are to be considered at the meeting to be held on 7 October 2015.

1. Neutralization of the Forces démocratiques de libération du Rwanda

2. In accordance with the relevant decisions of the United Nations, the African Union, the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region (ICGLR) and the Southern African Development Community, the Forces armées de la République démocratique du Congo (FARDC) are fully engaged in an operation to forcibly disarm this negative force, despite the unilateral withdrawal of the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO).

3. The strength of the Forces démocratiques de libération du Rwanda (FDLR) has been considerably reduced from the initial assessment of 1,200 combatants: a figure confirmed by the joint mission of Chiefs of General Staff and ICGLR countries, including Rwanda. The build-up of FARDC and the effectiveness of their operations against FDLR have considerably neutralized this negative force. Furthermore, tremendous human and material sacrifices have been made by the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, leading to the following results being achieved:

(a) 438 FDLR members surrendered during the voluntary surrender phase (from May 2014 to 20 January 2015);

(b) 13 combatants surrendered during the intermediary phase (from 21 to 27 January 2015);

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(c) 415 FDLR combatants were neutralized during the forced disarmament phase (from 28 January to 31 July 2015);

(d) A residual force of 334 FDLR combatants (i.e. 438, 13 and 415 subtracted from 1,200) remains to be neutralized.

4. As noted in the report of the Secretary-General, disarmed FDLR ex-combatants are now cantoned in clearly identified sites. Their number can therefore easily be confirmed. In answering a question from an elected member of the Rwandan parliamentary Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Cooperation and Security on 11 February 2015, the Rwandan Minister of Defence, General James Kabarebe, confirmed that FDLR was no longer a military threat to Rwanda. In other words, even the Rwandan authorities recognize the remarkable progress that has been made to put an end to this negative force.

5. The Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo wishes to confirm here its firm resolve to continue operations against all negative forces until they are fully neutralized.

6. The Government calls for more engagement from the international community in general and from the Security Council in particular for the repatriation to Rwanda of the disarmed and cantoned ex-combatants currently located in Walungu, Kanyabayonga and Kinsangani, or for their prompt resettlement in a third country outside of the Great Lakes Region. Until their repatriation or resettlement occurs, the material costs of these persons and their families should continue to be borne by the international community so that no unpredictable consequences are allowed to arise.

2. Implementation of the Nairobi Declaration (former movement of 23 March)

7. It will be recalled that the former movement of 23 March (M23) was defeated on 5 November 2013 and its combatants fled to Rwanda and Uganda: 786 elements were received in Rwanda and around 1,600 in Uganda.

8. Two identification missions were dispatched by the Democratic Republic of the Congo to Rwanda and Uganda, before undertaking to repatriate defeated ex-M23 members. The field visits resulted in the identification of 1,600 ex-combatants in Uganda, whereas only 453 were counted in Rwanda.

9. It should be recalled that the report of the United Nations Group of Experts (S/2013/433, paragraphs 36 to 43) confirmed that the leaders of M23, Sultani Makenga and Bosco Ntaganda, had established a network to recruit and enlist demobilized Rwandan soldiers. It can therefore be argued that the 336 missing combatants in Rwanda were probably Rwandan soldiers who had been demobilized upon their return or reassigned to other Rwandan units.

10. The official M23 representative appointed to the national oversight mechanism under the Framework, Mr. René Abandi, never came to Kinshasa to work in his office or to participate in the various meetings to assess implementation of the Nairobi Declaration's roadmap. To date, none of the invitations addressed to him or the appeals made to him by the international community have been acted upon.

11. It was in this context that the meetings scheduled for 20 May in Goma and 1 September 2014 in Kinshasa were boycotted by Mr. René Abandi, who however

proposed a meeting in Kampala. A solemn invitation to meet in Kinshasa on 7 and 8 November was then sent to him, as witnessed by the special envoys and special representatives acting as guarantors of the Framework, in accordance with the provisions of the Nairobi Declaration. He also declined this invitation.

12. The national oversight mechanism established a roadmap to address the issue of the commitments undertaken by several Governments under the Nairobi Declaration. Several meetings to assess the roadmap were held with the guarantors of the Framework in attendance. They all condemned the absence of the ex-M23 representative, which stopped any significant progress from being made in the implementation of the Nairobi Declaration.

13. The working group, which was established at the request of the summit held in Luanda on 18 March 2015 and comprises representatives of the United Nations, ICGLR, the Ugandan Government and the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, noted that the ex-M23 political and military leadership based in Kampala and led by Mr. Sultani Makenga and Mr. Bertrand Bisimwa continued to have influence over former combatants and was urging them to reject repatriation to the Democratic Republic of the Congo.

14. In the light of the foregoing, it should be noted that the Democratic Republic of the Congo is the only side implementing the Nairobi Declaration. Conversely, the M23 leaders systematically refuse to uphold their commitments and oppose the voluntary repatriation of their combatants. This is despite the flexibility shown by the President of the Republic in deciding to allow their unconditional repatriation first to disarmament, demobilization and reintegration sites, followed by reintegration in communities freely chosen by each and every individual.

15. The final communiqué of the sixth meeting of the national oversight mechanism under the Framework condemned this attitude and stated that the ex-M23 leadership must implement the Nairobi Declaration or else would face sanctions from the international community.

16. Accordingly, the Democratic Republic of the Congo calls on the Security Council to note these obstructions and to consider appropriate sanctions.

3. The third national demobilization, disarmament and reintegration plan

17. The Democratic Republic of the Congo decided to begin implementing its third national demobilization, disarmament and reintegration plan on 17 May 2015, with full and exclusive funding from the Government. This has made it possible to build start-up facilities, to set up technical teams and equipment, and to provide food and medical care for ex-combatants. This third national programme is mainly intended for the demobilization, disarmament and socioeconomic reintegration of national former combatants. The Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo notes that, at this stage, the contribution from MONUSCO has consisted of making two flights available to officials from the Democratic Republic of the Congo at the time of the launching ceremony.

18. The budget for the third national demobilization, disarmament and reintegration plan is $85 million. The Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo has endorsed a contribution of $10 million to date and has already

disbursed $3 million, which helped to finance the start-up operations described in the previous paragraph. It is therefore not accurate to state that the programme was obstructed by a lack of funds from the Government.

19. In addition to some erroneous figures (for example, there are 4,558 demobilized former combatants and not 5,385), MONUSCO fails to distinguish between the sensitization of voluntary disarmament activities, conducted by FARDC in the pre-demobilization, disarmament and reintegration phase among national armed groups in the east of the Republic, and the issue of FDLR members cantoned in Walungu, Kanyabayonga and Kisangani.

20. The MONUSCO leadership has informed the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo that a total budget allocation of $8 million has been agreed in support of demobilization, disarmament and reintegration activities. MONUSCO has already supported the third national demobilization, disarmament and reintegration plan by covering the costs for:

(a) Two months of food supplies (from 16 July to 15 September 2015);

(b) Two months of medical supplies;

(c) Clothing kits;

(d) Some organized flights.

21. The largest expenditures were incurred by the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo.

22. The participants at the sixth meeting of the regional oversight mechanism under the Framework called on the international community to increase its assistance both to MONUSCO (as part of disarmament, demobilization, repatriation, resettlement and reintegration activities) and to the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (under the third national demobilization, disarmament and reintegration plan).

23. The international community must provide appropriate funding, effectively cover material costs and provide for the appropriate socioeconomic reintegration of national ex-combatants, as these are the pillars of national reconciliation and peacebuilding. A failure to finance the programme and its possible weakening might give rise to frustration among these former combatants, which could have devastating consequences in terms of violence and conflict.

4. Restoration of State authority and security sector reform in the Democratic Republic of the Congo

24. State authority has been effectively restored in all of the areas formerly occupied by armed groups (ex-M23, the Allied Democratic Forces and FDLR) in North and South Kivu.

25. The territorial authorities have been established, the police have been deployed, the courts and tribunals have resumed their activities, internally displaced persons and some refugees have started to return to their communities, and the army is patrolling the entire territory to combat armed groups where necessary and to protect the population.

26. Three rapid reaction brigades are already in place, with provisions made for substantive staff and individual and collective equipment.

5. Elections

27. The Democratic Republic of the Congo is preparing to hold general elections for the third time, after those held in 2006 and 2011. The holding of these elections, scheduled for the 2015-2016 cycle, shows the will to break conclusively with the spiral of violence and instability that has characterized this process in recent decades and to commit the people of the Democratic Republic of the Congo to a lasting culture of democracy.

28. Despite the many financial and logistical constraints hampering the electoral process, the national independent electoral commission, with support from the Government, is making every effort to meet the challenge of holding transparent and credible elections conducted in an atmosphere of calm.

29. In this regard, President Joseph Kabila Kabange has been engaged in constant outreach efforts since May 2015 with all segments of society in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (politicians, civil society and religious and traditional authorities), in order to begin a national dialogue with a view to establishing a consensus on the electoral process under way, in accordance with the Constitution.

6. Sexual violence

30. The Army Command has taken draconian steps to eradicate the scourge of sexual violence, which was mainly due to newly integrated armed groups.

31. The Supreme Commander has taken strong steps to deal with this by decreeing a zero tolerance policy in this area, including by imposing military justice along the entire frontline and by appointing a personal representative to combat sexual violence and the recruitment of child soldiers. He has also promoted three women to the rank of General in order to increase awareness. The results on the ground are highly encouraging. In 2014 alone, 135 court rulings were handed down, including convictions of senior officers.

7. Child soldiers

32. It should be noted that this phenomenon dates back to 2003, when elements from different armed groups and rebellions were integrated into FARDC. This integration was critical for peace and national reconciliation.

33. Today, the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo has taken drastic steps to eradicate this phenomenon: firstly, biometric registration is widely used within the army and secondly, laws and other regulations to protect children are enacted and strictly enforced. The Government has recovered 46,000 child soldiers, who have returned to civilian life over the 10 years of the programme.

34. As of today, there are no children within FARDC. This finding was also the result of a joint audit carried out by the Government and the United Nations

Children's Fund. The Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo is determined to neutralize all armed groups recruiting children.

8. Strategic dialogue with the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo and troop reduction

35. The Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo desires a positive outcome to the strategic dialogue with MONUSCO, and which has been under way at the recommendation of the United Nations Secretary-General since March 2015.

36. The framework for this dialogue and its terms of reference were proposed by MONUSCO and were accepted by the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo because they addressed all of the Government's major concerns, namely:

(a) The resumption of joint FARDC-MONUSCO operations against FDLR;

(b) The elections;

(c) The human rights question (human rights reports produced by MONUSCO on the Democratic Republic of the Congo);

(d) The future of Radio Okapi;

(e) The issue of troop reduction.

37. Notable compromises were made on the first four points as a result of these discussions. However, the conclusion of the strategic dialogue has stalled on the issue of a troop drawdown.

38. Given the improved security situation on the ground and the progress made with security sector reform, in particular the establishment of three rapid reaction brigades, and in view of the ability of the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo to henceforth govern the entire national territory, including areas formerly controlled by armed groups (such as ex-M23, FDLR and Mayi-Mayi groups), the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo calls for the start of a gradual and significant reduction in the military component of MONUSCO.

39. In the face of this complex and multifaceted situation, the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo advocates for an overall solution.

40. Lastly, the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo reaffirms its resolve to continue the operations still under way against FDLR until this negative force is entirely eradicated. Moreover, this is the ultimate goal we all share.

41. In conclusion, the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo requests the Security Council:

(a) To take note of the progress made in reducing the capacity of FDLR to cause harm to the populations of Rwanda and the Democratic Republic of the Congo, and of the imperative for the international community to repatriate to Rwanda those FDLR members who have voluntarily surrendered and are cantoned in the Walungu, Kanyabayonga and Kinsangani transit camps. Prior to this repatriation, their material and humanitarian care costs should continue to be borne by the international community;

(b) To consider sanctions against the ex-M23 leadership, as proposed by Heads of States of the signatory countries to the Framework at their last high-level meeting of the regional oversight mechanism, held in New York on 29 September 2015;

(c) To demand that the international community should honour its commitments by providing significant funding to the third national demobilization, disarmament and reintegration plan in order to support the efforts mainly being undertaken by the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo;

(d) To take note of the effective restoration of State authority throughout territories formerly occupied by armed groups and negative forces;

(e) To take note also of the progress made by the Democratic Republic of the Congo in combatting sexual violence and the recruitment of child soldiers, and order the removal of the Democratic Republic of the Congo from the countries listed by the United Nations for those two crimes;

(f) To welcome the desire of the Democratic Republic of the Congo to achieve a positive outcome from the strategic dialogue so that joint operations against FDLR can be resumed, in accordance with the mission assigned to MONUSCO by Security Council resolution 2098 (2013), while also taking into account the sovereignty of the Democratic Republic of the Congo and recognizing the human and material sacrifices made by FARDC.

42. I should be grateful if you would arrange to have this letter circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Ignace Gata **Mavita**
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

United Nations S/2015/761

Security Council

Distr.: General
12 October 2015

Original: English

Identical letters dated 5 October 2015 from the Permanent Representative of the Syrian Arab Republic to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council

Upon instructions from my Government, I would like to draw your kind attention to the attached information regarding the mortar shells and rockets fired by terrorist groups on the city of Damascus and its suburbs during the period from 16 September to 2 October 2015, which resulted in the death and injury of many civilians (see annex).

It would be highly appreciated if the present letter and its annex were circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Bashar **Ja'afari**
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

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Annex to the identical letters dated 5 October 2015 from the Permanent Representative of the Syrian Arab Republic to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council

[Original: Arabic]

Missiles that landed in Damascus governorate and Rif Dimashq governorate on 16 September 2015

	Number of missiles	*Location*	*Deaths*	*Injuries*	*Material damage*
Damascus	3	– Abbasiyin neighbourhood – Damascus central prison	None	4	Several homes and vehicles
Rif Dimashq	3	– The military housing compound	None	None	Material damage to the compound wall
Total	**6**		**–**	**4**	

Missiles that landed in Damascus governorate and Rif Dimashq governorate on 17 September 2015

	Number of missiles	*Location*	*Deaths*	*Injuries*	*Material damage*
Damascus	10	– Inside the Hayat tunnel next to Hayat Hospital – The Qusur area – Eastern Tijarah, in the Khumasiyah building garden – Behind the Tropicana in Abu Jarash park – Qassa' area: Iliya Abu Madi school, Zablatani area and Baradat square	1	8	Several vehicles, houses and shops
Rif Dimashq	Unknown number in the dozens	– Ashrafiyat Sahnaya – The cannery on Ghutah road – Damascus International Airport compound – Assad quarter in Harasta – Tall Kurdi – Military housing compound in the Wafidin camp	2	24	Several vehicles, motorcycles, houses and shops
Total	**Unknown**		**3**	**32**	

Missiles that landed in Damascus governorate and Rif Dimashq governorate on 18 September 2015

	Number of missiles	*Location*	*Deaths*	*Injuries*	*Material damage*
Damascus	2	– Qusur area opposite the greengrocer – Qassa' area: Qaymariyah neighbourhood near the tomb of Rabi'ah al-Shamiyah	None	1	Several houses
Rif Dimashq	1	Damascus International Airport road	None	None	Road surface
Total	**3**		**None**	**1**	

Missiles that landed in Damascus governorate and Rif Dimashq governorate on 19 September 2015

	Number of missiles	*Location*	*Deaths*	*Injuries*	*Material damage*
Damascus	2	– Qusur area next to the greengrocer and Kindi street	None	5	Several vehicles and shops
Rif Dimashq	Dozens of missiles	– Wafidin camp – Area around the Assad quarter in Harasta	No information on deaths	No information on injuries	Unavailable at the present time
Total					

Missiles that landed in Damascus governorate and Rif Dimashq governorate on 20 September 2015

	Number	*Location*	*Deaths*	*Injuries*	*Material damage*
Damascus	1	– Azbakiyah area, Murshid Khatir street	None	None	1 house
Rif Dimashq	Unknown number of missiles in the dozens	– Military housing compound – Wafidin camp for internally displaced persons – Harasta area hills – Branch compound in Harasta	None	5	Material damage at points of impact
Total	**Unknown**		**–**	**5**	

Missiles that landed in Damascus governorate and Rif Dimashq governorate on 21 September 2015

	Number of missiles	*Location*	*Deaths*	*Injuries*	*Material damage*
Damascus	1	– Qassa': Baradat square in new Suq al-Hal	1	None	Material damage to some vehicles
Rif Dimashq	Undetermined number	– Military housing compound in Wafidin camp – Tall Kurdi Farms in Duma	None	4 soldiers	Material damage at points of impact
Total	**Unknown**		**1**	**4**	

Missiles that landed in the city of Damascus on Tuesday 22 September 2015

No.	*Location*	*Number of missiles*	*Time*	*Damage*
1	Qusur – the square	1	0830	Material damage
2	Next to Diyafah Palace	3	1800	Material damage

Resulted in material damage.

Missiles that landed in the city of Damascus on Friday 25 September 2015

No.	*Location*	*Number of missiles*	*Time*	*Damage*
1	Bab Tuma	5	1135	Material damage

Resulted in material damage.

Missiles that landed in the city of Damascus on Saturday 26 September 2015

No.	*Location*	*Number of missiles*	*Time*	*Damage*
1	Qabun area	10	2330	3 injuries and material damage

Resulted in 3 injuries and material damage.

Missiles that landed in the city of Damascus on Sunday 27 September 2015

No.	*Location*	*Number of missiles*	*Time*	*Damage*
1	Bab Tuma – Shaykh Raslan mosque garden	1	1530	4 injuries and material damage
2	Fayha' tunnel	1	1855	1 injury and material damage

Resulted in 5 injuries and material damage.

Missiles that landed in the city of Damascus on Tuesday 29 September 2015

No.	*Location*	*Number of missiles*	*Time*	*Damage*
1	Bab al-Salam	1	1310	Material damage
2	Bab Tuma square next to the Thaqafi mosque	1	1330	Material damage
3	Bab Tuma — Sufaniyah Park	1	1330	2 injuries and material damage
4	Zablatani — Suq al-Buzuriyah	2	1400	Material damage
5	Mazzah 86 — school road	1	1410	Material damage
6	Near the Maliki roundabout	2	1410	2 deaths, 1 injury and material damage

Resulted in 2 deaths, 3 injuries and material damage.

Missiles that landed in the city of Damascus on Wednesday 30 September 2015

No.	*Location*	*Number of missiles*	*Time*	*Damage*
1	Roof of the Opera House	Failed to explode	1615	Material damage
2	Opposite the Criminal Security Directorate	1	1615	Material damage
3	Sheraton Hotel	1	1620	2 injuries and material damage

Resulted in 2 injuries and material damage.

Missiles that landed in the city of Damascus on Thursday 1 October 2015

No.	*Location*	*Number of missiles*	*Time*	*Damage*
1	Near the Russian embassy	1	1535	Material damage
2	Ush al-Wurur	1	1555	1 child killed and material damage

Resulted in the death of one girl and material damage.

Missiles that landed in the city of Damascus on Friday 2 October 2015

No.	*Location*	*Number of missiles*	*Time*	*Damage*
1	Bab Tuma	1	1335	Material damage
2	Rawdah area	1	1610	Material damage

Resulted in material damage.

United Nations S/2015/762

Security Council

Distr.: General
7 October 2015

Original: English

Letter dated 7 October 2015 from the Secretary-General addressed to the President of the Security Council

1. I refer to Security Council resolution 2232 (2015), by which the Council requested me, in consultation with all stakeholders, to carry out a strategic review of the United Nations Support Office for the African Union Mission in Somalia (UNSOA), including a thorough review of support provided to the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) by all partners, and set out a wide range of options on how to improve overall support to AMISOM, in the context of the efficiency surge outlined in paragraph 6 of the resolution, including through making improvements to the performance, management and structures of UNSOA, bearing in mind the imperative of responsible cost control and taking into account the availability of resources.

2. In line with that request, a strategic review of UNSOA was undertaken, under the leadership of the Department of Field Support, between July and September 2015. A team comprising representatives of the United Nations Secretariat (the Department of Field Support, the Department of Peacekeeping Operations, the Department of Political Affairs, the Department of Safety and Security and the United Nations Office to the African Union), the African Union and Member States travelled to Addis Ababa, Nairobi, Mogadishu and Baidoa, where it held extensive consultations with several interlocutors. These included the Federal Government of Somalia, the African Union, including AMISOM and its troop- and police-contributing countries, UNSOM, the Office of the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for the Great Lakes Region, the Somalia and Eritrea Monitoring Group, the European Union, Member States and Secretariat entities, including the Department of Field Support, the Department of Peacekeeping Operations, the Department of Political Affairs, the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR), the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, the United Nations Office to the African Union and the Department of Safety and Security, as well as United Nations agencies, funds and programmes and UNSOA. The review was undertaken applying the principle of comprehensive and wide-ranging consultations, underpinned by an evidence- and metrics-based approach to assessing performance.

3. In its resolution 2232 (2015), the Security Council also took note of my recommendation to establish a non-lethal support package for the Somali police force and stressed that an appropriate United Nations trust fund or voluntary funding arrangement should be used to fund such support if authorized by the Council. The Council requested me to provide further details for implementation

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and delivery of such support by 30 September 2015. The Council also took note of my recommendation to extend the Somali National Army non-lethal support package authorized in paragraph 14 of resolution 2124 (2013) to 3,000 Puntland forces on an exceptional basis, and requested me to explore the feasibility of implementing that recommendation and to report to the Council by no later than 30 September 2015.

4. In line with those requests, the United Nations further developed, in consultation with the Federal Government of Somalia, the concept for the start-up support to the Somali police and the non-lethal support to the Somali National Army troops in Puntland. The options and recommendations summarized in the present letter are also informed by the overall findings of the UNSOA strategic review.

United Nations Support Office for the African Union Mission in Somalia: strategic review

5. As mentioned in my letter of 2 July 2015, all efforts of the international community should be aligned to support the political process in Somalia, with a view to bringing peace and stability to the country in the long term. In particular, efforts on the security front should be aimed at creating and preserving an enabling environment for the political, peace and reconciliation process to unfold. This approach was endorsed by the Security Council in its resolution 2232 (2015).

6. The strategic review assessed the performance of UNSOA in support of the above-mentioned approach and against the core objectives that I have established for the delivery of field support, namely, effectiveness, responsiveness, efficiency and responsible stewardship.

Operating context

7. The Somalia context today is vastly complex, comprising a Federal Government that is simultaneously instituting a federal political system and its complementary institutions across an extensive territory while dealing with insecurity and violent extremism on a large scale. This translates into unique security, operational and programme delivery challenges for the United Nations effort to "stay and deliver" in partnership with the African Union.

8. In this environment, the role and impact of field support as a strategic enabler of peace operations has grown significantly, while the logistical enabling environment has remained weak and fragile, challenged by insecurity and a lack of access to major supply routes.

Evolution of mandated tasks

9. UNSOA was established pursuant to Security Council resolution 1863 (2009) with an initial mandate to provide a logistical support package aimed at providing mission support services to AMISOM with a view to raising operational standards in order for AMISOM forces to be incorporated into a United Nations peacekeeping operation.

10. As initially authorized, the logistical package covered accommodation, rations, water, fuel, armoured vehicles, vehicle maintenance, communications, enhancement to key logistics facilities, medical treatment and evacuation services. It did not allow for the direct transfer of funds to the African Union or AMISOM and was

intended to be one element of a hybrid model of support through assessed and voluntary contributions. At the time, the logistical package was provided to a military-focused operation with an authorized strength of 8,000 troops and an area of operation limited to Mogadishu.

11. Since its authorization, the scale and scope of the United Nations support package has been in a constant and dramatic state of expansion. In terms of scale, the logistical package was expanded three times as the authorized strength of AMISOM grew from 8,000 to 12,000 in 2010, to 17,731 in 2012 and to 22,126 in 2013, currently constituting the largest United Nations-mandated force in peace operations.

12. In terms of scope, the initial package as authorized has been expanded on four separate occasions to include:

(a) Direct provision of catering, communications, cleaning and sanitary, and furniture and stationery services provided in kind to AMISOM in line with the restriction on direct transfers that were initially in place;

(b) Provision of strategic communication and explosive hazard management capacities (including mitigating the threat of explosive devices);

(c) Reimbursement of AMISOM major contingent-owned equipment in line with United Nations practices and rates (lifting the restriction on the direct transfer of funds to the African Union and AMISOM);

(d) Provision of support to up to 70 personnel within the AMISOM civilian component.

13. In addition, by its resolution 2102 (2013), the Security Council established UNSOM and also mandated UNSOA to provide mission support services to it.

14. In resolution 2124 (2013), the Security Council further mandated UNSOA to provide a non-lethal support package, funded from voluntary sources, to 10,900 Somali National Army personnel, when operating alongside AMISOM, consisting of food, water, fuel, transport, tents and in-theatre medical evacuation.

15. Separate from those mandates, the Secretariat decided that UNSOA, through its Nairobi-based presence, would take on the provision of support to the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for the Great Lakes Region and the Somalia and Eritrea Monitoring Group.

16. The delivery of support to those mandates has taken place in an extremely non-permissive environment, framed by the significantly higher operational intensity of AMISOM and the Somali National Army operations compared with standard United Nations peacekeeping operations.

17. In sum, the demands placed on UNSOA have dramatically increased since its establishment. It is now mandated to support both very high-intensity military operations and highly mobile political engagement across different areas of operation and in an operating environment that has become much more complex logistically and much more difficult in terms of security. The number of personnel supported by UNSOA has more than quadrupled to over 33,000, the number of entities supported has increased from one to five and the area of operations has increased 4,000 times over.

18. In responding to this expansion, the Secretariat has underestimated the scale and scope of demands that support to these entities would entail, with the overall support component expanding from 249 to 450 personnel and the budget from $215 million to $600 million, growth factors of 1.8 and 2.8 times, respectively.

19. As a result, UNSOA has become an underresourced support mission that, despite pioneering innovative approaches that have positively contributed to the gains made by AMISOM and UNSOM, is significantly constrained in delivering on the demands being placed on it.

Assessment of support to mandate delivery

20. The strategic review assessed support to mandate delivery as a combination of effectiveness, responsiveness and efficiency. While it was found that performance was mixed across each of these individual criteria, there was, overall, a real and widening gap between mandated tasks and support capacity to deliver them. In particular, it was noted that the historical emphasis on efficiency has had a direct impact on effectiveness and responsiveness.

21. In the review, it was noted that UNSOA was effective and responsive in the delivery of certain elements of the logistical support package to AMISOM, including rations, fuel, communication and medical support. UNSOA has also been able to respond effectively in support of UNSOM during major political events and in optimizing the use of its existing assets, infrastructure and capacities in support of the wider United Nations and international effort. In that regard, approximately 20 per cent of all UNSOA passengers were a combination of United Nations country team personnel, Somali officials or members of the diplomatic community. In addition, and in response to recent attacks, members of the United Nations country team and diplomatic community have been temporarily accommodated within the UNSOA/UNSOM compound in Mogadishu.

22. In other critical areas, however, it was found that UNSOA was unable to fully meet the demands placed on it. Gaps have appeared, in particular with regard to the ability to provide water in remote locations, field defence supplies, maintenance services, tentage for tactical deployments, recruitment and administrative support, access to mobility for programmatic activities and significant delays in the completion of construction in the UNSOM regional offices and AMISOM sector hubs outside Mogadishu.

23. The review also noted concerns commonly held by the clients of UNSOA with respect to the challenges that the Office faced in providing support across competing demands, the visibility on the part of clients regarding key operational and resourcing activities being undertaken, and access to more predictable support.

24. Beyond the operational delivery priorities of UNSOA, it was noted in the review that the Office was headed by a director based in Mogadishu with a limited senior leadership team. As such, there were real gaps in the strategic engagement capacity of UNSOA to maintain liaison at senior levels with key stakeholders, including the African Union, AMISOM troop- and police-contributing countries, Member States and AMISOM regional partners.

25. In terms of efficiency, it was confirmed in the review that UNSOA was very efficient, with indicative comparators across a range of peacekeeping missions showing UNSOA utilizing a lower resource base to deliver mission support services.

This was particularly stark in the case of the number of support personnel, where UNSOA had a supported-to-support personnel ratio between 3 and 10 times lower than comparable missions.

26. UNSOA has been able to deliver this by pioneering the "light footprint" concept and outsourcing model. This approach has brought real gains and flexibility in operating in high-risk environments, including by maximizing the programmatic footprint on the ground.

27. This efficiency, however, is also partially driven by the underresourcing referred to above, with a direct impact on the ability of UNSOA to be responsive and more effective in meeting the needs of all its clients. Furthermore, there is a largely unavoidable risk associated with very high reliance on one mode of delivery through outsourcing, as opposed to a more resilient service delivery model where outsourcing and organic capacity are more balanced.

28. The light footprint approach has brought a number of tangible gains. However, the staffing capacities and processes of UNSOA need to be significantly strengthened. In that regard, UNSOA is undergoing an internal restructuring to bring it in line with United Nations supply chain and service delivery policies for peace operations. A civilian staffing review has also been conducted with the aim of adapting the UNSOA staffing complement and structure to its mandate and the resultant expectations.

29. In the review, a number of wider critical issues that need to be addressed were identified. First, different understandings exist among the African Union, the troop-contributing countries and the United Nations as to the extent of the logistical support package that UNSOA is mandated to deliver. In particular, there was a gap between the support package mandated by the Security Council and the memorandums of understanding currently in place between the African Union and AMISOM troop- and police-contributing countries.

30. Second, mechanisms for joint planning and coordination both within and among UNSOA, AMISOM and UNSOM to enable the establishment of joint strategic resourcing priorities need to be strengthened, taking into account the operational realities on the ground and the real capacity constraints of UNSOA. That would allow for focused attention and clear delineation of responsibility and accountability.

31. Third, and as previously noted in my report on the future of United Nations peace operations: implementation of the recommendations of the High-level Independent Panel on Peace Operations (A/70/357-S/2015/682), the current administrative framework for peace operations is often slow, cumbersome and averse to risk.

32. This is particularly important in the Somalia context, where there is a need to respond consistently and rapidly to high-intensity and fast-changing operations in both AMISOM and UNSOM. The current administrative framework, which on average takes 180 days to recruit someone from a roster, 288 days for purchases through a systems contract to be delivered, and 114 days to amend an existing contract, limits process risk but places the preponderance of risk on mandate implementation.

Assessment of responsible stewardship

33. In addition to delivering its mandated tasks, it is essential for UNSOA to meet the requirements of responsible stewardship that apply to all United Nations entities. Compliance with the United Nations human rights due diligence policy is a cornerstone of the partnership between the United Nations and the African Union in Somalia and a precondition for the provision of support to AMISOM, the Somali National Army and eventually to the Somali police forces.

34. In the strategic review, it was noted that in the case of Somalia, a United Nations system-wide human rights due diligence policy framework was in place under the overall authority and responsibility of my Special Representative and that a review of existing structures and practices was under way. In the context of United Nations support to AMISOM and the Somali National Army as provided through UNSOA, it was noted in the review that the following measures were in the process of being implemented:

(a) First, the overall monitoring framework in Somalia will be strengthened with dedicated operational support from UNSOA. This will be done through four mechanisms: (i) the strengthening of UNSOA procedures to better track support and the way it has been used; (ii) the provision of human rights due diligence policy training for all UNSOA and UNSOM personnel to facilitate monitoring; (iii) the strengthening of the existing human rights monitoring function within UNSOM in respect of all entities receiving support from the United Nations system and supplemented by the sharing of information with the Civilian Casualty Tracking, Analysis and Response Cell of AMISOM; and (iv) by the sharing of information between UNSOA and UNSOM, with regular reporting by UNSOA and other United Nations entities delivering support to non-United Nations security forces;

(b) Second, through its Human Rights Section, UNSOM will support UNSOA with the necessary monitoring, risk assessment and responsibilities under the human rights due diligence policy, with UNSOA directly supplying resources to UNSOM for that purpose and playing a proactive role in human rights due diligence policy-related mechanisms;

(c) Third, given the continuing nature of the UNSOA mandate to support AMISOM and the Somali National Army, regular risk assessments will be undertaken on a quarterly basis to provide both UNSOA and my Special Representative with updated and accurate information about the overall level of risk of human rights violations by support beneficiaries. This would be in addition to specific and ad hoc requests for support, which already require risk assessments. The review noted the importance of AMISOM taking action in cases where violations are reported and implementing any mitigating measures necessary for United Nations support to be delivered in compliance with the human rights due diligence policy.

35. In the review, it was also noted that United Nations entities providing support to non-United Nations security forces have the responsibility to ensure that their support is in compliance with the human rights due diligence policy, while my Special Representative has overall responsibility for the implementation of the policy in Somalia. This includes my Special Representative informing AMISOM and the Somali National Army of any measures that they need to take to comply

with the policy as well as making any decisions regarding the suspension of support, which would be done in consultation with United Nations Headquarters.

36. While there is no record of allegations of sexual exploitation or sexual abuse by UNSOA or UNSOM staff members and only a handful of other allegations each year for other types of misconduct, past allegations of sexual exploitation and abuse by AMISOM personnel and more recent allegations of indiscriminate use of force by AMISOM against civilians are indicative of some of the risks faced by the United Nations when providing operational support to a military force in combat operations. The human rights due diligence policy will continue to guide our activities in Somalia and the United Nations will need to ensure that human rights risks are assessed and addressed properly.

37. The impact on the environment of the United Nations-supported activities in Somalia also remains a concern. The review noted the absence of an environmental baseline study, dedicated environmental management capacities and an African Union environmental policy to guide AMISOM operations, particularly with regard to wastewater management.

Logistics support package and enabling capabilities of the African Union Mission in Somalia

38. While assessing the AMISOM support package, it was noted in the review that the initial restrictions within the logistical support package with regard to the direct transfer of funds had been lifted in 2012. However, legacy restrictions remain with regard to elements of the package related to catering, communications, cleaning and sanitary, and furniture and stationery services approved before 2012 and still provided in kind. These services are normally provided by the troop-contributing country and reimbursed under the self-sustainment framework in line with United Nations practices.

39. Further challenges raised during the review related to the issue of logistical mobility along the main supply routes and down to tactical locations. The challenges were twofold: ensuring clarity on roles and responsibilities between UNSOA and AMISOM; and addressing capacity gaps.

40. Recognizing the strain that would be placed on logistical supply lines when AMISOM deployed outside Mogadishu and the need to have an organic logistical capability, 1,845 uniformed personnel were authorized as part of the AMISOM strength referred to in resolution 2124 (2013) to serve as enabling units. Only a small number of these enablers have since been deployed and they have largely remained contingent rather than becoming force assets.

41. In the review, a significant gap in the overall logistical capabilities of individual contingents was also identified, with AMISOM having approximately 30 per cent of the support mobility capabilities of United Nations missions of similar size.

42. Owing to security risks along the main supply routes and the inability of civilian contractors to operate in such conditions without force protection, UNSOA is unable to use the main supply routes on a sustainable basis for the delivery of logistical support. As such, UNSOA currently flies rations to approximately half of all the troops deployed outside Mogadishu, a situation that is both operationally and financially unsustainable.

43. In this context, it was reaffirmed in the review that logistical mobility was a joint responsibility of UNSOA and AMISOM. UNSOA, with force protection, would be responsible for delivery along the main supply routes to the sector hubs and battalion headquarters locations and AMISOM would be responsible for carrying it forward from that point using its own organic capacity.

44. The United Nations remains committed to working together with partners to assist the African Union in generating the authorized capacities called for in resolution 2124 (2013) and as part of the efficiency surge supported in resolution 2232 (2015). This will allow AMISOM to significantly enhance its logistical capabilities. It is, however, likely to be a longer-term solution.

45. In the interim and in addressing the challenges of mobility and reliance on air support, UNSOA will support the establishment of mission enabling units within AMISOM comprising organic heavy transport, combat engineering, explosive hazard management capability (including mitigating the threat of improvised explosive devices) and security elements.

46. The mission enabling units would build on initial arrangements in two of the six operational sectors of AMISOM, where they would be under the command and control of AMISOM, but with training and mentoring provided by the United Nations and equipment provided through a combination of donor support and the United Nations logistical package. This, of course, will incur significant additional costs and can be operationalized only in the medium-term perspective.

47. In the short term, AMISOM will have to continue to rely on air deliveries to these locations, with the associated costs that they entail. In parallel, individual contingents would need to raise their equipment levels in order to move their supplies from their battalion headquarters forward, in line with the roles and responsibilities agreed between AMISOM and UNSOA. Bilateral support, both equipment and training, to these contingents will be critical in that regard.

48. Lastly, the predictable and sustainable provision of ammunition was raised as a gap in the provision of support to AMISOM. I propose that the Security Council consider urging Member States to overcome this gap through bilateral assistance.

Support to the United Nations Assistance Mission in Somalia and the political process

49. Support to UNSOM in the framework of Somalia's emerging federal map requires going beyond the area of operations of AMISOM. As outlined in my letter of 2 July 2015, the implementation of the overall political and security strategy will require progressively aligning security efforts with the federalism process, especially in terms of the development of the Somali security sector, the alignment of AMISOM sector boundaries with the newly formed interim regional administrations, and engagement with the regional authorities.

50. Pending this progressive realignment and in support of the mandate to strengthen the presence of UNSOM in all interim regional administrative capitals, focused support is required for UNSOM to facilitate this deployment. In the review, the need to be responsive to the dynamic and sometimes unplanned surge requirements of support to the political process, including access to aviation and mobility assets, was also recognized.

51. In the coming months, these needs will likely increase as engagement with the Somali people for the implementation of Vision 2016 grows. I therefore support the call, in the strategic review, for strengthened joint planning and coordination mechanisms between UNSOM and AMISOM, to allow for a dynamic management of limited resources.

Restructuring of the United Nations Support Office for the African Union Mission in Somalia

52. The senior leadership structure of UNSOA comprises a Director, a Deputy Director and a Chief of Operations in Somalia. In accordance with resolution 2093 (2013), the Office reports to the Department of Field Support on the delivery of the support package to AMISOM and the Somali National Army and to my Special Representative on logistical support to UNSOM and on policy or political questions arising from the work of UNSOA that are relevant to the mandate of UNSOM. In the review, a number of deficits in the way in which the Office was structured were also identified.

53. The deficits included a senior leadership structure that did not provide sufficiently for the separate and distinct roles of strategic engagement and operational delivery. Practically, that means that UNSOA does not have the capacity to service the mutually dependent relationship among the United Nations, the African Union, AMISOM troop-contributing countries and bilateral partners at the strategic level while simultaneously undertaking a robust operational leadership role in Mogadishu.

54. In the review, it was also noted that the current mandate of UNSOA was scattered across several resolutions with differences of view on how they should be interpreted. There has also been no regular practice of reporting to the Security Council, except through my periodic reports on Somalia. Furthermore, the name of UNSOA continues to reflect only its responsibilities to AMISOM, whereas its mandate is in fact bound to the mandates of both AMISOM and UNSOM.

Start-up support package to the Somali police

55. In my letter of 2 July 2015, I fully supported the recommendation of the joint mission to deliver a non-lethal support package to jump-start policing in the regions and bridge the gap between today's needs and the longer-term mechanisms under the framework of the New Deal Compact for Somalia. In its resolution 2232 (2015), the Security Council took note of the recommendation, requested further details from the Secretary-General for implementation and delivery of such support by 30 September 2015, and underlined that such support should be provided in accordance with the human rights due diligence policy on United Nations support to non-United Nations forces.

56. I recommended that the package include the provision of elementary infrastructure, basic equipment, sustainment items and medical evacuation support. AMISOM, in collaboration with UNSOM and other partners, has the capacity to provide training for the Somali police forces. However, without the requisite logistical support, including water, food, interpreters, stationery and other course material, such training cannot take place. It is therefore recommended that logistical training support be included as a fifth element.

57. In my letter of 2 July 2015 to the Security Council, I proposed that UNSOA provide support for the delivery of fuel and in-theatre medical evacuation. However, given the gaps between UNSOA capacities today and the demands of its current mandate, new tasks for UNSOA will come at the opportunity cost of a continued inability to meet all existing demands. As such, I recommend that fuel support to the Somali police be provided by another United Nations entity. I also recommend that the funding mechanism for the police package be directly administered by the entity that will implement it, rather than using the Somali National Army trust fund. In the specific case of in-theatre evacuation, however, I believe that it is important that UNSOA provide this support on a basis similar to that provided to the Somali National Army. The support will be provided by leveraging its existing capacities and in areas where AMISOM is deployed.

58. The United Nations has looked at a number of options to provide the remaining four items of the package. At this stage, the United Nations Office for Project Services (UNOPS) seems best positioned, given that it is experienced in working throughout Somalia supporting the national and regional authorities and AMISOM. UNOPS implements the disbursement of stipends and the biometric registration system, which could be utilized for asset accountability tracking through bar coding of equipment and linking to the payment of stipends. UNOPS is implementing projects to strengthen police capacity in Somalia, in particular with regard to providing equipment and developing explosive ordnance disposal and improvised explosive device defeat capacities.

59. Coordination of the support package with other support initiatives and prioritization as agreed by the federal and regional authorities will take place in the peacebuilding and State-building goal 2 Police Working Group within the national police development plan (Heegan Plan) currently under development. A project management structure of the implementing entity would be established within UNSOM to support effective coordination within wider security sector reform efforts and to make the required expertise available to the implementer.

60. To ensure compliance with the human rights due diligence policy, AMISOM and UNSOM would play a key role in assisting in the vetting of candidates and provide training in human rights and international humanitarian law. It is envisaged that UNSOM will begin to assist the Federal Government of Somalia in establishing vetting criteria and to provide technical support to the vetting process in line with international human rights standards. UNSOM will also provide advice and technical assistance to strengthen the legal and policy framework on oversight, investigations and accountability. It is expected that AMISOM police working alongside the Somali police forces and providing operational support will have a deterrent effect and support reporting on human rights violations.

Non-lethal support to the Somali National Army forces in Puntland

61. In my letter of 2 July 2015, I recommended that the provision of the Somali National Army non-lethal support package be expanded to 3,000 Puntland forces, on an exceptional basis until the end of 2016, upon completion of the integration process and inclusion in the Gulwaade (Victory) Plan. This is intended to facilitate the efforts of the Puntland forces against Al-Shabaab and help to prevent a negative spillover from the conflict in Yemen. In its resolution 2232 (2015), the Security Council took note of the recommendation and requested the Secretary-General to

explore the feasibility of implementing this recommendation. It also highlighted the criteria for providing support to the Somali National Army specified in resolution 2124 (2013), specifically that such exceptional support shall be provided only for joint Somali National Army operations with AMISOM and which are part of the overall strategic concept of AMISOM.

62. Since my letter of 2 July 2015, the work of the National Integration Commission has continued. Discussions are ongoing between the Federal Government of Somalia and Puntland, as well as with the international community within the framework of the New Deal Compact, with the aim of conducting the integration process in Puntland in the first half of 2016.

63. All Puntland forces integrated into the Somali National Army will need to be provided with training in full compliance with the human rights due diligence policy as a condition of eligibility for United Nations support. While potential trainers have been identified, further assistance will be needed to financially and logistically support this training. Furthermore, while non-United Nations military trainers will also likely be needed to ensure other training requirements under the integration process, no entity that is both willing to carry out such training and is acceptable to the Puntland Government has yet been identified. Moreover, lessons learned from the provision of the current non-lethal support package to the Somali National Army have shown the importance of ensuring that those who receive the support package are paid regularly to allow the provision of support to have its intended effect. This lesson should be taken into account in the roll-out of the proposed support to the Puntland forces and in the ongoing provision of support authorized under resolution 2124 (2013).

64. I would like to emphasize that non-lethal support to Puntland must be provided in line with the following principles:

(a) Supporting the political vision of building a federal state: Integration of the Puntland forces into the Somali National Army must be completed in a manner that furthers the objective of developing a federal security architecture;

(b) Coherence and oversight: Support to the 3,000 Puntland forces must be carried out in a manner that supports overall civilian oversight and the command and control of the Somali National Army, including common salary scales and training curriculum;

(c) Conflict sensitivity: The integration process and the provision of support will be informed by the context, the conflict and risk assessments;

(d) Risk mitigation: Integration and the process for providing support will be designed and implemented to reduce risks;

(e) Sustainability: The support provided should include a capacity-building element that allows a gradual transition of logistical support tasks to Somali counterparts.

65. I have examined the concept and feasibility of the options available for entities to provide the non-lethal support package to the Puntland forces that are to be integrated into the Somali National Army. While UNSOA is currently providing the non-lethal support package to the Somali National Army troops operating alongside AMISOM in south central Somalia, gaps in the provision of this support were also identified in the review. In that regard and as outlined above, the gaps between the

capacity of UNSOA today and the demands of its current mandate require a focus on strengthening support to its core clients in their areas of operation.

66. Moreover, as support to the Somali security forces is a long-term endeavour, greater efficiency may be realized by working with another United Nations provider that is better placed to perform this task. Such an entity would also likely be better positioned to work with the Somali National Army to build its capacity in the medium term.

67. Coordination of the Puntland support package with the non-lethal package already provided by UNSOA to troops operating alongside AMISOM, as well as other support initiatives as required, will take place in the peacebuilding and State-building goal 2 Defence Working Group.

Observations and recommendations

68. UNSOA has contributed positively to supporting the gains made by AMISOM and UNSOM, often pioneering innovative approaches to the provision of field support in a unique and non-permissive environment. It has also provided tangible evidence of success in the partnership among the United Nations, the African Union and Member States in sustaining African Union peace support operations. Investment in, and support to, this partnership should continue.

69. It is clear that despite the innovation and best efforts of UNSOA, the resources provided to the Office and its resultant capabilities have not been able to keep pace with the dramatic expansion of its mandated tasks. Indeed, it is difficult to imagine offensive operations in any other theatre today that would involve 32,000 uniformed personnel but with a support element of less than 500 personnel. This support element is, in parallel, also required to support a highly mobile political effort.

70. In sum, UNSOA has been operating at the very edge of its capabilities, with a progressively widening gap between mandated tasks and its capacity to deliver. Going forward, AMISOM will require surge support to address gaps. UNSOM will also require specific and focused support to respond to demands to support the political process in Mogadishu and the regions, especially the interim regional capitals. Neither will be possible without a significant strengthening of UNSOA.

71. I therefore intend to strengthen UNSOA along the lines set out below and, in this, seek the support of the Security Council.

72. First, it is critical to consolidate and prioritize the efforts of UNSOA around the strategic objectives established for Somalia by the Security Council. This would entail focusing primarily on facilitating the political process in Somalia through support to UNSOM and AMISOM. I therefore intend to transfer the responsibility for the provision of mission support services to the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for the Great Lakes Region and the Somalia and Eritrea Monitoring Group to another United Nations entity more suitably placed to provide such support.

73. Second, I intend to address administrative, coordination and structural gaps.

74. Administratively, current processes struggle to respond to the operational demands in Somalia. As noted in my report on the future of United Nations peacekeeping operations: implementation of the recommendations of the High-level Independent Panel on Peace Operations (A/70/357-S/2015/682), I am putting in place, by the end of 2015, standing administrative measures for start-up and crisis

situations, to go into effect for six months on a renewable basis upon the establishment of a peace operation or my certification of a crisis or emergency. Given that UNSOA has been in an almost constant state of expansion since its establishment, I will look closely at how these measures could potentially be applied in that context.

75. There is a need to strengthen decision-making frameworks between UNSOM and AMISOM, including at the senior leadership level with the Special Representative of the Secretary-General and the Special Representative of the Chairperson of the African Union Commission for Somalia for AMISOM, to ensure that operational efforts are aligned with a common set of strategic priorities, linked to capabilities and taking into account the threat environment. I have asked my Special Representative to establish this framework with support from UNSOA and in consultation with the Department of Field Support.

76. Structural gaps also need to be addressed. In that regard, I propose that the Security Council rename UNSOA to clearly reflect its expanded mandate and endorse a strengthening of its leadership, including by appointing a Head at the Assistant Secretary-General level. This renamed entity would have a single and clear mandate focused on the provision of support to, but operationally separate from, its core clients, namely, UNSOM, AMISOM and the Somali National Army.

77. The renamed entity would have clear accountability mechanisms, through a compact, for the provision of support to each client and a reporting relationship with the Security Council through my Special Representative. This formal reporting would be complemented by informal and technical-level briefings that would be conducted by the Under-Secretary-General for Field Support, as requested by the Council.

78. I also expect that the ongoing internal restructuring of UNSOA in line with United Nations supply chain and service delivery models for peace operations will contribute to improving the effectiveness of mission support services.

79. Third, the overall capacity of UNSOA is simply inadequate. I therefore intend to present proposals to the General Assembly for a significant strengthening of the staffing complement of UNSOA, based on the findings of the civilian staffing review of UNSOA that is under way. In this context, it is important to note that the light footprint approach has been broadly successful and that UNSOA has been used as the support model for the establishment of the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali and the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic.

80. In both of these subsequent missions, lessons were learned in the application of the light footprint approach, including the overall capacity required which, compared with UNSOA, is significantly higher. These lessons have informed the civilian staffing review. Any strengthening of UNSOA should be viewed through the lens of the application of lessons learned in other missions and the gaps identified in the specific context of Somalia.

81. The partnership with the African Union will be critical to our joint success in Somalia. I intend to strengthen the partnership and our support to the African Union, especially in the context of the generation of its enabling capacity and the AMISOM efficiency surge.

82. I intend to urgently finalize discussions on a new trilateral memorandum of understanding framework among the United Nations, the African Union and AMISOM troop- and police-contributing countries. This will serve as a basis for jointly improving performance, including raising the visibility of and regularizing equipment levels within the maintenance and contingent-owned equipment reimbursement frameworks.

83. I also propose that the Security Council consider lifting the legacy restrictions around the provision of catering, communications, cleaning and sanitary, and furniture and stationery services. I recommend that services be provided in line with United Nations practices and that troop-contributing countries that are willing and able to provide such services themselves be reimbursed directly in line with the existing United Nations self-sustainment reimbursement framework.

84. I further propose that this framework be extended to include the reimbursement of tentage for tactical deployments, in lieu of its provision by UNSOA and in line with normal United Nations practices and self-sustainment rates.

85. Clear roles and responsibilities for the delivery of sustainable logistical support within the framework of the joint responsibilities of AMISOM and UNSOA have been a critical and positive step. However, the inability to maintain the main supply routes open as the primary basis for the delivery of logistical support remains a concern. A situation where half of the forces outside Mogadishu are supported by air is not a sustainable option.

86. In parallel with the generation of enabling units by the African Union, I will proceed urgently with supporting the establishment of mission enabling units and progressively expanding that capacity to all sectors. Equipment for existing capacities on the ground has been funded by bilateral contributions supplemented from the United Nations logistical package. Additional equipment required to support the establishment of these units could be funded either through direct bilateral sources or through an expansion of the logistical package.

87. In addition, individual contingents will need to raise their equipment levels in order to undertake their own responsibilities to take supplies forward from AMISOM sector hubs and battalion headquarters locations. I call upon Member States to urgently support AMISOM troop-contributing countries in that regard.

88. In support of these efforts, I also recommend that the Security Council consider assigning a specific mandate for UNSOA to support the efforts of AMISOM in the coordination of support among bilateral partners, AMISOM and the United Nations.

89. On support to the Somali security forces, I remain of the view that the expansion of the Somali National Army support package to Puntland forces is critical to their efforts against Al-Shabaab and to help to prevent further conflict as a result of the conflict in Yemen.

90. Sustainability of the delivery of this support in the long run and infrastructure support to facilitate handover are key factors in determining the providers. I therefore recommend that support to the Somali National Army in Puntland be provided by a United Nations entity other than UNSOA and will continue to work towards identifying the best mechanism.

91. I also strongly support the establishment of a police support package as a fundamental means to deliver basic security services in newly recovered areas and to create an enabling environment for stabilization and the political process to succeed.

92. I will use existing UNSOA modalities on a cost-recovery basis for the Somali police forces for casualties sustained in the line of duty and in areas of operation where similar support is provided to AMISOM and the Somali National Army. This includes extending the in-theatre medical evacuation to the Somali National Police Force.

93. The provision of logistical support by the United Nations to the Somali security forces should, however, not be open-ended. It should be seen as an exceptional measure. It is essential that this assistance be coupled with a concerted effort to build the capacity of the Somali security forces to assume responsibility for their own logistics.

94. I therefore intend to work with international partners to support the Somali federal and regional institutions in this regard. I look forward to the support of Member States in providing the necessary technical and material expertise to these institutions.

95. I will pay particular attention to the implementation of the human rights due diligence policy in the delivery of all support to AMISOM and the Somali security forces. In that regard, the steps outlined in the review will help to strengthen United Nations mechanisms and engagement with AMISOM and the Somali National Army. These include, in particular, strengthening the monitoring systems of the United Nations, with additional capacity, which will be reflected in the civilian staffing review.

96. The impact on the environment, in particular wastewater management, remains a core concern. I will establish a robust capacity to support UNSOA and propose that the Security Council give UNSOA a mandate to assist the African Union and AMISOM in the development of their own environmental policies and standards and to ensure subsequent compliance with them.

97. While recognizing that there have been no reports of allegations of sexual exploitation or sexual abuse in UNSOA or UNSOM, I nonetheless strongly support the establishment of a dedicated capacity for conduct and discipline in UNSOA to support UNSOA and UNSOM and to advise the African Union and AMISOM on the development and implementation of its zero-tolerance policy. This is especially important as the Organization's own policy and implementation mechanisms continue to evolve with the approval by the General Assembly of special measures to strengthen the United Nations response to sexual exploitation and abuse.

98. Many of the recommendations outlined above will take time to materialize on the ground. Although implementation must start now, we must also be cognizant that, in the short term, the capacity of UNSOA will continue to be overstretched. Joint prioritization and comprehensive approaches that bring together programmatic, security and logistical imperatives and constraints will therefore be required.

99. Mission support services provided by UNSOA are strategic enablers that provide the platform for supporting political progress in the country, through

specific support to AMISOM, UNSOM and the Somali National Army. As Somalia continues to make progress towards peace and stability, it is critical that the United Nations keep reviewing and adapting its posture and resources to a fast-evolving environment.

100. Strengthening and refocusing UNSOA is essential in this context. I look forward to the support of the Security Council for my recommendations and efforts as a means of strengthening the ability of the United Nations and the international community to secure the important gains achieved and allow continued progress in the political and stabilization processes in Somalia.

(*Signed*) **BAN** Ki-moon